Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 27,10 (IV, 3, 10) — A alma do mundo é a intermediária que (...)

ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 27,10 (IV, 3, 10) — A alma do mundo é a intermediária que faz participar o sensível ao inteligível

Enéada IV, 3, 10

quarta-feira 30 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

3. Alma   del cosmos. Segunda explicación (caps. 11-12):

  • a) Creación e iluminación de la materia (10, 1-10).
  • b) Modus operandi del Alma: opera al modo de la naturaleza, no al modo del arte (10, 10-29).
  • c) Doble actividad del Alma: una interna y otra externa (10, 29-42).
  • d) Acción mediadora del Alma (cap. 11). [IGAL  ]
    

Míguez

10. Luego de haber escuchado esto conviene volver a la idea   de que el universo   es siempre tal cual es, tomando con él todas las cosas, como el aire, la luz y el sol, o la luna  , la luz y de nuevo el sol, que se dan todos ellos a la vez, salvo que el uno (el sol) ocupa el primer lugar, la otra (la luz), el segundo, y la última (la luna), el tercero. Así podemos imaginar al alma  , luego a las cosas que primero la siguen y, por último, a las que vienen a continuación. Son éstas como las últimas luces de un fuego, posteriores en todo a él y provenientes de la sombra de este último fuego inteligible; pero esta sombra se ilumina y surge como una forma que la cierra, que es la oscuridad total y primera. Todo ello queda ordenado racionalmente por el alma, la cual posee en sí misma la potencia de ordenar la oscuridad según razones determinadas. Es lo que ocurre igualmente con las razones seminales, que modelan e informan a los seres animados como si fueran pequeños mundos.

Lo que tiene relación con el alma es modelado según lo pide naturalmente su misma sustancia; pero el alma no actúa con reflexión extraña, ni esperando pacientemente determinación o encuesta natural, sino producto de una técnica   importada. Mas el arte es posterior   a la naturaleza y, aunque la imita, lo hace con imitaciones oscuras y muy débiles, con juguetes de poco valor  , no obstante las numerosas máquinas de que se sirve para la producción de esas imágenes. El alma es señora de los cuerpos por la misma potencia de su ser; los hace nacer y los conduce al estado   que desea, sin que los cuerpos puedan oponerse en un principio a su voluntad. Posteriormente, estos mismos cuerpos se interponen con frecuencia y se ven privados así de alcanzar la forma propia a la que apunta, aunque todavía en germen, la razón de cada uno. Digamos que la forma del universo es producida por el alma y que, con esta ordenación, nacen a la vez todas las cosas sin esfuerzo alguno. Lo que es producido de esta manera, y libre naturalmente de todo impedimento  , habrá de resultar bello. Ahí se han construido por el alma santuarios para los dioses, moradas para los hombres y todos los demás objetos para los otros seres; porque, ¿qué otra cosa podría venir del alma que no fuese precisamente lo que ella tiene posibilidad de hacer? Si el poder del fuego es el calor y el de algún otro cuerpo el enfriamiento, el poder del alma debe considerarse en dos sentidos: o ejerciéndose sobre otro ser o actuando sobre ella misma. En cuanto a los seres inanimados su acción es cual un sueño, si no sale de ellos mismos; y, si realmente tiende a otra cosa, hará semejante a ella todo aquello que pueda recibirla. Porque es algo común a cualquier ser el hacer que los otros se le semejen. La acción del alma —y nos referimos aquí a la que permanece en su interior— se mantiene siempre tan despierta como la que se ejerce sobre otra cosa. Produce la vida en todos aquellos seres que, por sí mismos, no la poseerían, y hace además que esa vida sea en un todo semejante a la suya. Como vive en la razón, da también al cuerpo una razón que es imagen de la que ella tiene —porque todo lo que da al cuerpo es una imagen de su vida- y todas aquellas formas de los cuerpos cuyas razones ella posee. Pero, como ella posee (las razones) de los dioses y de todas las cosas, habrá que admitir que las posee igualmente el universo.

Bouillet

X. Maintenant, revenons à ce qui a toujours été ce qu’il est. Embrassons par la pensée tous les êtres, comme l’air, la lumière  , le soleil, la lune. Représentons-nous encore le soleil, la lumière, etc., comme étant toutes choses, sans oublier toutefois qu’il y a des choses qui occupent le premier rang, d’autres le second ou le troisième. Au sommet de cette série des êtres, concevons l’Âme universelle subsistant éternellement. Plaçons ensuite ce qui tient le premier rang après elle, et continuons ainsi jusqu’à ce que nous arrivions aux choses qui occupent le dernier rang, et qui sont en quelque sorte les dernières lueurs de la lumière que répand l’Âme ; représentons-nous ces choses comme une étendue d’abord ténébreuse, puis illuminée par la forme qui vient s’ajouter à un fond primitivement obscur. Ce fond est embelli par la Raison en vertu de la puissance que l’Âme universelle tout entière a par elle-même d’embellir la mati  ère au moyen des raisons, comme les raisons séminales (οἱ ἐν σπέρματα λόγοι) façonnent et forment elles-mêmes les animaux et en font de petits mondes (μικροὶ κόσμοι). L’Âme donne à tout ce qu’elle touche une forme selon sa nature ; elle produit sans conception adventice, sans les lenteurs de la délibération ni celles de la détermination volontaire. Sinon, elle n’agirait plus selon sa nature, mais selon les préceptes d’un art emprunté. L’art en effet est postérieur à la nature : il l’imite en produisant d’obscures et faibles imitations de ses œuvres, des jouets sans prix ni mérite, et il emploie d’ailleurs un grand appareil de machines pour produire ces images (63). L’Âme universelle, au contraire, dominant les corps par la vertu de son essence, les fait devenir et être ce qu’elle veut : car les choses mêmes qui existent depuis le commencement ne peuvent opposer de résistance à sa volonté. Souvent, dans les choses inférieures, par suite de l’obstacle qu’elles se font les unes aux autres, la matière ne reçoit pas la forme propre que la raison [séminale] contient en germe (64). Mais, comme l’Âme universelle produit la forme universelle, et que toutes choses y sont coordonnées ensemble, l’œuvre est belle parce qu’elle est réalisée sans peine ni obstacle. Il y a dans l’univers des temples pour les dieux, des maisons pour les hommes, et d’autres objets adaptés aux besoins des autres êtres. Que pouvait en effet créer l’Âme, sinon ce qu’elle a la puissance de créer? Comme le feu échauffe, comme la neige refroidit (65), l’Âme agit tantôt en elle-même, tantôt hors d’elle-même et sur d’autres objets. L’action que les êtres inanimés tirent d’eux-mêmes sommeille en quelque sorte en eux (66), et celle qu’ils 287 exercent sur les autres consiste à rendre semblable à eux-mêmes ce qui peut pâtir. C’est en effet le caractère commun de tout être de rendre le reste semblable à soi. Quant à l’Âme, la puissance qu’elle a d’agir soit en elle, soit sur les autres choses, est une faculté vigilante. Elle communique la vie aux êtres qui ne l’ont point par eux-mêmes, et la vie qu’elle leur communique est semblable à sa propre vie. Or, vivant dans la Raison, elle donne au corps une raison, qui est une image de celle qu’elle-même possède : en effet, ce qu’elle communique aux corps est une image de la vie. Elle leur donne également les formes (μορφαί) dont elle possède les raisons. Or, elle possède les raisons de toutes choses, même des dieux (67). C’est pourquoi le monde contient toutes choses.

Guthrie

THE WORLD-SOUL PROGRESSIVELY INFORMS ALL THINGS.

10. Now let us return to that which has always been what it is. Let us, in thought, embrace all beings: air, light, sun, and moon. Let us then consider the sun, the light, and so forth, as being all things, without ever forgetting that there are things that occupy the first rank, others the second, or the third. Let us, at the summit of this series of beings, conceive of the universal   Soul as subsisting eternally. Let us then posit that which holds the first rank after her, and thus continue till we arrive at the things that occupy the last rank, and which, as it were, are the last glimmerings of the light shed by the soul. Let us represent these things as an extension first dark, and then later illuminated by the form which comes to impress itself on an originally dark background. This background is embellished by reason in virtue of the entire universal Soul’s independent power of embellishing matter by means of reasons, just as the «seminal reasons» themselves fashion and form animals as microcosms. According to its nature, the Soul gives a form to everything she touches. She produces without casual conception, without the delays of deliberation, or of those of voluntary determination. Otherwise, she would not be acting according to her nature, but according to the precepts of a borrowed art. Art, indeed, is posterior to nature. Art imitates by producing obscure and feeble imitations of nature’s works, toys without value or merit; and besides, art makes use of a great battery of apparatus to produce these images. On the contrary, the universal Soul, dominating bodies by virtue of her nature («being») makes them become and be what she desires; for the things themselves that exist since the beginning cannot raise resistance to her will. In inferior   things, as the result of mutual obstruction, matter does not receive the exact form that the («seminal) reason» contains in germ. But as the universal Soul produces the universal form, and as all things are therein co-ordinated, the work is beautiful because it is realized without trouble or obstacle. In the universe there are temples for the divinities, houses for men, and other objects adapted to the needs of other beings. What indeed could the Soul create if not what she has the power to create ? As fire warms, as snow cools, the soul acts now within herself, and then outside of herself, and on other objects. The action which inanimate beings elicit from themselves slumbers, as it were, within them; and that which they exert on others consists in assimilating to themselves that which is capable of an experience. To render the rest similar to itself, is indeed the common characteristic of every being. The soul’s power of acting on herself and on others is a vigilant faculty. It communicates life to beings who do not have it in themselves, and the life communicated to them is similar to the life of the soul herself. Now as the soul lives in reason, she imparts a reason to the body, which reason is an image of the one she herself possesses. Indeed, what she communicates to the bodies is an image of life. She also imparts to them the shapes whose reasons she contains. Now as she possesses the reasons of all things, even of the divinities, the world contains all things.

Taylor

X. Thus conceiving, therefore, it is requisite that again betaking ourselves to that which always subsists invariably the same, we should assume all things existing at once, such as the air, light, the sun, and the moon. And, likewise, that we should again consider light and the sun as at once all things, but having the order of things first, second, and third. Here, also, we must consider soul as being always established; and in the next place, we must assume the natures which are first, and those that are in a consequent order, as the extremity of fire in that which is posterior; from the shadow of that fire which subsists at the extremity of things, forming a conception of the fire which rants as the first. In the next place, we must conceive this ultimate fire to be at the same time illuminated, so as to resemble form running into that nature which is hurled towards it, which was first generated, and is entirely obscure. It is, however, adorned according to reason by the power of soul, which possesses in itself wholly a power of adorning by reasons [or productive principles] ; just as the reasons in seeds fashion and give form to animals, as if they were certain little worlds. For whatever comes into contact with soul, is made to be such as the essence of soul is naturally adapted to make it. Soul, however, makes, not by an adventitious decision, nor by waiting for counsel and consideration; for thus it would make not according to nature, but according to adscititious art. For art is posterior to, and imitates soul; producing obscure and imbecile imitations, which are things of a ludicrous nature, and not of much worth, and employing many machines in the formation of images. But soul by the power of essence has dominion over bodies in such a way, that they are generated and subsist, just as she leads them, since they are unable from the first to oppose her will. For in things of a posterior nature which impede each other, matter is frequently deprived of the attainment of the appropriate form which the productive principle [latent] in the seed wished it to have. There, however [i.e., in the universe], the whole form being generated by soul, and the generated natures having at the same time an arrangement, that which is produced becomes beautiful without labour, and without impediment. But in the universe are fabricated, some things indeed which are statues of the Gods, others which are the habitations of men, and others which are adapted to other things. For what else ought to be generated about soul, except those things which it possesses the power of producing ? For the property of fire is to produce heat, and of another thing [cold] to refrigerate. But the peculiarity of soul is, partly to produce something from itself into another thing, and partly to produce something in itself. For in inanimate natures, indeed, that which is from themselves, lies in them as it were in a dormant state; but that which tends to another thing, endeavours to assimilate to itself that which is able to be passive to it. And this is common to each of them, to lead other things to a similitude to itself. That which energizes, however, in soul is something of a vigilant nature, and this is also the case with that which tends from it to another thing. Hence, it causes other things to live which do not live from themselves, and confers on them such a life as it lives itself. The life of soul, therefore, being essentialized in reason, imparts reason to body, as an image of that which it possesses itself. For that which it imparts to body is an image of life. Body, also, receives from soul corporeal morphae, of which soul contains the productive principles. Soul, likewise, comprehends in itself the productive principles of Gods, [1] and of all things. Hence, the world also contains all things in itself.

MacKenna

10. In view of all this we must now work back from the items to the unit, and consider the entire scheme as one enduring thing.

We ascend from air, light, sun - or, moon and light and sun - in detail, to these things as constituting a total - though a total of degrees, primary, secondary, tertiary. Thence we come to the [kosmic] Soul, always the one undiscriminated entity. At this point in our survey we have before us the over-world and all that follows upon it. That suite [the lower and material world] we take to be the very last effect that has penetrated to its furthest reach.

Our knowledge of the first is gained from the ultimate of all, from the very shadow cast by the fire, because this ultimate [the material world] itself receives its share of the general light, something of the nature of the Forming-Idea hovering over the outcast that at first lay in blank obscurity. It is brought under the scheme of reason by the efficacy of soul whose entire extension latently holds this rationalizing power. As we know, the Reason-Principles carried in animal   seed fashion and shape living beings into so many universes in the small. For whatsoever touches soul is moulded to the nature of soul’s own Real-Being.

We are not to think that the Soul acts upon the object by conformity to any external judgement; there is no pause for willing or planning: any such procedure would not be an act of sheer nature, but one of applied art: but art is of later origin than soul; it is an imitator, producing dim and feeble copies - toys, things of no great worth - and it is dependent upon all sorts of mechanism by which alone its images can be produced. The soul, on the contrary, is sovereign over material things by might of Real-Being; their quality is determined by its lead, and those elementary things cannot stand against its will. On the later level, things are hindered one by the other, and thus often fall short of the characteristic shape at which their unextended Reason-Principle must be aiming; in that other world [under the soul but above the material] the entire shape [as well   as the idea] comes from soul, and all that is produced takes and keeps its appointed place in a unity, so that the engendered thing, without labour as without clash, becomes all that it should be. In that world the soul has elaborated its creation, the images of the gods, dwellings for men, each existing to some peculiar purpose.

Soul could produce none but the things which truly represent its powers: fire produces warmth; another source produces cold; soul has a double efficacy, its act within itself, and its act from within outwards towards the new production.

In soulless entities, the outgo [natural to everything] remains dormant, and any efficiency they have is to bring to their own likeness whatever is amenable to their act. All existence has this tendency to bring other things to likeness; but the soul has the distinction of possessing at once an action of conscious attention within itself, and an action towards the outer. It has thus the function of giving life to all that does not live by prior right, and the life it gives is commensurate with its own; that is to say, living in reason, it communicates reason to the body - an image of the reason within itself, just as the life given to the body is an image of Real-Being - and it bestows, also, upon that material the appropriate shapes of which it contains the Reason-Forms.

The content of the creative soul includes the Ideal shapes of gods and of all else: and hence it is that the kosmos   contains all.


[1i.e. Of divine souls, each of which is a God according to participation. See the first book of my translation of Proclus «On the Theology of Plato.»