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Plotino - Tratado 27,7 (IV, 3, 7) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: argumentos do Filebo e do Fedro

Enéada IV, 3, 7

terça-feira 21 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    
    

Míguez

7. Pero bastante se ha dicho a este respecto. Ahora nos queda por considerar la sospecha manifestada en el Filebo   de que las otras almas son partes del alma   del universo   [1]. Esta opinión platónica no tiene el sentido que algunos quieren darle, sino que significa, en la medida en que era útil   para Platón  , que el cielo   es un ser animado. Lo cual prueba afirmando que resulta absurdo un cielo inanimado, ya que nosotros, que disponemos de una parte del cuerpo del universo, contamos también con un alma, ¿Cómo, pues, podría contar con un alma una parte del universo, si el todo precisamente no la tiene? Más claramente expone su pensamiento en el Timeo; aquí, una vez nacida el alma del universo (el demiurgo  ) fabrica las demás almas tomando la mezcla de la misma vasija; esto es, las hace semejantes a aquélla, dándoles tan sólo la diferencia de segundo o tercer rango. Pero aún parece más justo lo que se dice en el Fedro  : “Toda alma está al cuidado   de lo que es inanimado” [2]. Porque, ¿qué otra cosa gobierna, modela y ordena la naturaleza corpórea sino el alma? Y no es verdad que una sola pueda hacerlo y las otras no. El alma perfecta, dice (Platón), el alma del universo que vuela por las alturas, produce sin sumergirse en el mundo, pero como si cabalgase sobre él: “así gobierna toda alma perfecta”. Cuando habla (Platón) del alma “que ha perdido las alas” la hace diferente al alma del universo. Si dice que sigue el movimiento circular del universo, que recibe su alimento e influencia, no prueba con ello que nuestras almas sean parte de aquélla [3]. Porque el alma está dispuesta para que se modelen en ella muchas cosas provenientes de la naturaleza de los lugares, de las aguas y del aire; en ella dejan su impronta las mansiones de las distintas ciudades y las uniones a los distintos cuerpos. Decíamos que al estar nosotros en el universo contamos con algo de su alma; incluso aceptamos el influjo   de la revolución circular, pero oponemos a todo esto otra alma, la cual se manifiesta diferente por su mismo grado de oposición. Aún nos resta el hecho de que nacemos en el interior del universo, mas a esta cuestión respondemos que el niño tiene un alma distinta a la de la madre  , no siendo, pues, la de ella la que penetra en su cuerpo.

Bouillet

VII. Voilà ce que nous croyons vrai sur ce sujet. Quant au passage du Philèbe [cité § 1], il pourrait faire croire que toutes les âmes sont des parties de l’Âme universelle. Ce n’en est point là cependant le sens véritable, comme quelques-uns le croient; il signifie seulement ce que Platon voulait établir en cet endroit, savoir que le ciel est animé. Platon le prouve en disant qu’il serait absurde de soutenir que le ciel n’a pas d’âme, quand notre corps, qui n’est qu’une partie du corps de l’univers, a cependant une âme ; or, comment la partie serait-elle animée sans que le tout le fût aussi ? C’est dans le Timée   surtout que Platon explique clairement sa pensée. Après avoir exposé la naissance de l’Âme universelle, il fait naître postérieurement les autres âmes du mélange opéré dans le même vase d’où a été tirée l’Âme universelle ; il admet qu’elles sont conformes à l’Âme universelle, et il fait consister leur différence en ce qu’elles occupent le second ou le troisième rang. C’est ce que confirme encore ce passage de Phèdre : « L’Âme universelle prend soin de ce qui est inanimé. » Quelle puissance en effet administre, façonne, ordonne, produit le corps, si ce n’est l’âme? Qu’on ne dise pas qu’une âme a ce pouvoir et qu’une autre ne l’a pas. « L’âme parfaite, ajoute Platon, l’Âme de l’univers, planant dans la région éthérée, agit sur le monde sans y entrer, étant portée au-dessus de lui comme dans un char; les autres âmes qui sont parfaites partagent avec elle l’administralion du monde [4]. » Quand Platon parle de l’âme qui a perdu ses ailes (πτερορρυήσασα), il distingue évidemment les âmes particulières de l’Âme universelle. S’il dit encore que les âmes suivent le mouvement circulaire de l’univers, qu’elles en tiennent leur caractère, qu’elles en subissent l’influence, on ne peut en conclure que nos âmes soient des parties de l’Âme universelle. En effet, elles peuvent fort bien subir   l’influence exercée par la nature des lieux [5], des eaux et de l’air sur les villes qu’elles habitent et sur le tempérament des corps auxquels elles sont unies. Nous avons reconnu qu’étant contenus dans l’univers, nous possédons quelque chose de la vie propre à l’Âme universelle, et que nous subissons l’influence du mouvement circulaire du ciel; mais nous avons aussi établi qu’il y a en nous une autre âme [6], qui est capable de résister à ces influences et qui manifeste son caractère différent précisément par la résistance qu’elle leur oppose. Quant à cette objection que nous sommes engendrés dans l’univers [7], nous répondrons que l’enfant est de même engendré dans le sein de sa mère, et que cependant l’âme qui entre dans son corps est distincte de celle de sa mère.

Guthrie

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL   SOULS.

7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by some. It only means what Plato desired to assert in this place, namely, that heaven is animate. Plato proves this by saying that it would be absurd to insist that heaven has no soul, when our body, which is only a part of the body of the universe, nevertheless has a soul; but how could a part be animate, unless the whole was so also? It is especially in the Timaeus that Plato clearly expresses his thought. After having described the birth of the universal Soul, he shows the other souls born later from the mixture made in the same vase from which the universal Soul was drawn. He asserts that they are similar to the universal Soul, and that their difference consists in that they occupy the second or third rank. That is further confirmed by this passage of the Phaedrus: «The universal Soul cares for what is inanimate.» Outside of the Soul, indeed, what power would manage, fashion, ordain and produce the body? It would be nonsense to attribute this power to one soul, and not to another. (Plato) adds (in substance): «The Perfect Soul, the Soul of the universe, hovering in the ethereal region, acts on the earth without entering into it, being borne above him as in a chariot  . The other souls that are perfect share with it the administration of the world.» When Plato speaks of the soul as having lost her wings, he is evidently distinguishing individual souls from the universal Soul. One might also conclude that our souls are part of the universal Soul from his statement that the souls follow the circular movement of the universe, that from it they derive their characteristics, and that they undergo its influence. Indeed, they might very easily undergo the influence exercised by the nature of the special localities, of the waters and the air of the towns they inhabit, and the temperament of the bodies to which they are joined. We have indeed acknowledged that, being contained in the universe, we possess something of the life-characteristic of the universal Soul, and that we undergo the influence of the circular movement of the heavens. But we have also shown that there is within us another (rational) soul, which is capable of resistance to these influences, and which manifests its different character precisely by the resistance she offers them. The objection that we are begotten within the universe may be answered by the fact that the child is likewise begotten within its mother’s womb, and that nevertheless the soul that enters into its body is distinct from that of its mother. Such is our solution of the problem.

Taylor

VII. And thus much concerning these particulars. What is said in the «Philebus,» however, may lead us to suspect that other souls are parts of the soul of the universe. But the meaning of what is there asserted, is not what some one may fancy, but was useful to Plato in demonstrating that the world is animated. This, therefore, he renders credible by saying that it is absurd to assert that the universe is inanimate, and that we who have a part of the body of the universe, have a soul. For how can a part have a soul, if the universe is inanimate. The opinion of Plato, however.is especially manifest in the «Timaeus;» where the Demiurgus having generated the soul of the universe, afterwards produces other souls, mingling them in the same crater in which he had mingled the soul of the world, and making them to be of a similar species with it, but assigning them a difference in a second and third degree. Nor is what he asserts in the «Phaedrus» wonderful, that every soul pays a guardian attention to that which is inanimate. For what is it except soul which governs, fashions, arranges, and produces the nature of body ? Nor must it be said, that one soul is naturally adapted to do this, but another not. The perfect soul, therefore, says he, revolves on high, not verging downward, but fabricates, riding in the world as it were as in a vehicle. Every other perfect soul, also governs the universe in a similar manner. But when he speaks of the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion, he evidently makes a difference between such a soul as this, and that of the universe. And when he adds, that souls follow the circulation of the universe, derive their manners from thence, and suffer from it, this does not at all indicate that our souls are parts of the soul of the world. For soul is sufficiently able to represent many things in itself, from the nature of places, and water  , and air. And to this ability, the habitations of different cities, and the temperature of bodies, also contribute. And if we should grant that since we are in the universe we have something from the soul of the world, and that we suffer from the celestial circulation, yet we shall oppose to these things another soul [i.e., the rational soul], and which by its resistance especially demonstrates itself to be a different soul. To the assertion, also, that we are generated within the world, we reply that the fœtus in the womb of the mother has a soul different from that of the mother, and which accedes to it externally. [8]

MacKenna

7. So far, so good: but what of the passage in the Philebus taken to imply that the other souls are parts of the All-Soul?

The statement there made does not bear the meaning read into it; it expresses only, what the author was then concerned with, that the heavens are ensouled - a teaching which he maintains in the observation that it is preposterous to make the heavens soulless when we, who contain a part of the body of the All, have a soul; how, he asks, could there be soul in the part and none in the total.

He makes his teaching quite clear in the Timaeus, where he shows us the other souls brought into existence after the All-Soul, but compounded from the same mixing bowl"; secondary and tertiary are duly marked off from the primal   but every form of soul is presented as being of identical ideal-nature with the All-Soul.

As for saying of the Phaedrus. «All that is soul cares for all that is soulless,» this simply tells us that the corporeal kind cannot be controlled - fashioned, set in place or brought into being - by anything but the Soul. And we cannot think that there is one soul whose nature includes this power and another without it. «The perfect soul, that of the All,» we read, «going its lofty journey, operates upon the kosmos   not by sinking into it, but, as it were, by brooding over it»; and «every perfect soul exercises this governance»; he distinguishes the other, the soul in this sphere as «the soul when its wing is broken.»

As for our souls being entrained in the kosmic circuit, and taking character and condition thence; this is no indication that they are parts: soul-nature may very well   take some tincture from even the qualities of place, from water and from air; residence in this city or in that, and the varying make-up of the body may have their influence [upon our human souls which, yet, are no parts of place or of body].

We have always admitted that as members of the universe we take over something from the All-Soul; we do not deny the influence of the Kosmic Circuit; but against all this we oppose another soul in us [the Intellectual as distinguished from the merely vitalizing] proven to be distinct by that power of opposition.

As for our being begotten children of the kosmos, we answer that in motherhood the entrant soul is distinct, is not the mother’s.


Ver online : ENÉADAS III-IV (Gredos)


[1Cf. Platón, Filebo, 30 a.

[2La expresión platónica, de la que tanto gusta Plotino, se encuentra en el Fedro, 246 b.

[3Véase, sobre todo, para las citas platónicas, el análisis que se hace del alma en el Fedro, 246 a - 247 e. El célebre mito del “carro alado" ejerce una especial sugestión sobre el espíritu de Plotino, que no aparta su pensamiento de la exposición fuertemente poética del Fedro.

[4Plotin paraphrase ici Platon au lieu de le citer textuellement.

[5Il y a dans le texte : ἱκανὴ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ παρὰ φύσεως τόπων πολλὰ ἀπομάττεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. Ficin traduit : « Potest enim anima ex natura locorum multa cœlitus imminentia propulsare. » Il donne ainsi à ἀπομάττεσθαι le sens d’ἐκβάλλειν, ce qui ne paraît pas convenir à la liaison des idées. Nous préférons l’interprétation de Taylor qui traduit : « For soul is sufflciently able to represent many things in itself, from the nature of places, etc. »

[6Plotin reconnaît dans l’Âme humaine deux parties principales, qu’il nomme l’âme irraisonnable et l’âme raisonnable.

[8i.e. It has a rational soul different from that of the mother. It is better, however, to say with Proclus, that as nature does nothing in vain, the presence of the rational soul to the foetus in the womb would be useless, as it could not then energize ; but that it becomes united to the irrational soul in the very moment in which the infant leaves the womb.