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Plotino - Tratado 27,3 (IV, 3, 3) — Poderemos dizer que as almas são partes da alma universal?

Enéada IV, 3, 3

quarta-feira 30 de março de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap 3-6: Resposta ao argumento 4: a analogia do macrocosmo e do microcosmo, se tratando das relações da alma e do corpo, não é recepcionável senão com o custo de certas precisões


a) La analogia entre la relación del Alma del cosmos con las partes del cosmos y la del alma del hombre con las partes del cuerpo humano requiere ciertas puntualizaciones y restricciones (cap. 3).

Míguez

3. ¿Podremos decir que las almas son partes del alma universal, a la manera como se dice que el alma del ser animado que se encuentra en el dedo es una parte de la totalidad del alma que se encuentra en aquél? Razonando así llegamos a una de estas conclusiones: o bien a admitir que no hay ninguna alma fuera del cuerpo, o bien a afirmar que ninguna alma se da en un cuerpo, de tal modo que la llamada alma del universo se encuentra también fuera del mundo. Esto es lo que habrá que examinar y para ello seguiremos ahora con la misma comparación.

Si el alma universal se ofrece a todos los seres animados en particular, y si cada alma particular es, por tal motivo, una parte de aquélla, una vez dividida, no podría ofrecerse realmente a cada uno de los seres animados. Porque es claro que el alma universal deberá ser la misma en todas partes, una y entera, aunque radicada a la vez en muchos seres. Esto no nos permite hablar, por una parte, de un alma universal y, por otra, de las partes de esa alma, sobre todo si aplicamos a éstas las mismas potencias. Porque el hecho de que a unos órganos se atribuya una función y a otros órganos otra, cual ocurre con los ojos y los oídos, no quiere decir que la parte del alma presente en la visión sea distinta a la parte del alma presente en la audición. Que sean otros los que dividan así. (Para nosotros) se trata de la misma alma, aunque en cada uno de los casos actúe una potencia diferente. En ambas facultades se encuentran verdaderamente todas las demás, proviniendo las diferencias de percepción de las diferencias existentes entre los órganos, ya que la percepción de todas las formas puede ser modificada a discreción. Lo hace manifiesto el que todas las impresiones vengan a parar necesariamente a un solo centro; pues es claro que cada uno de los órganos no puede recibir todas las impresiones, sino que éstas manifiestan diferencias con relación a los órganos que las reciben. Ahora bien, el juicio formulado sobre las distintas impresiones descansa en un principio único que, a la manera de un juez, comprende las razones enunciadas y los actos ejecutados.
Se dirá entonces que el alma universal es una unidad presente en todas partes, aunque con funciones diferentes. Si sus partes se conciben como las sensaciones, ninguna de ellas podrá pensar, lo cual corresponderá sólo al alma universal. Porque si cada parte tuviese su pensamiento propio, existiría realmente en sí misma. Siendo, además, el alma racional, y, según se dice, tan racional como universal, ha de ser idéntica al alma ya mencionada, pero no, en modo alguno, una parte del todo.

Bouillet

III. Les âmes particulières sont-elles enfin des parties de l’Âme universelle comme, dans un animal, l’âme qui fait vivre le doigt est une partie de l’âme totale répandue dans l’animal entier? Cette hypothèse conduit à admettre ou qu’il n’y a aucune âme en dehors du corps, ou que l’Âme universelle existe tout entière, non dans un corps, mais en dehors du corps du monde. C’est ce qu’il faut examiner. Pour cela, procédons en nous servant d’une comparaison (20).

Si l’Âme universelle se communique à tous les animaux particuliers, et si c’est en ce sens que chaque âme est une 269 partie de l’Âme universelle (car, une fois divisée, l’Âme universelle ne saurait se communiquer à chaque partie), il faut que l’Âme universelle soit partout tout entière, qu’elle soit une et la même à la fois dans les divers êtres. Or, cette hypothèse ne permet plus de distinguer d’un côté l’Âme universelle, de l’autre les parties de cette âme, d’autant plus que ces parties ont la même puissance [que l’Âme universelle] : car, même pour les organes qui ont des fonctions diverses, comme les yeux et les oreilles, on n’admettra pas qu’il y ait une partie de l’âme dans les yeux, une autre dans les oreilles (une telle division ne convient qu’à des choses qui n’ont rien de commun avec l’âme) ; mais on dira que c’est bien la même partie de l’âme qui anime ces deux organes, en exerçant dans chacun d’eux une faculté différente. En effet, toutes les puissances de l’âme sont présentes dans ces deux sens [la vue, l’ouïe], et la différence de leurs perceptions a pour cause unique la différence des organes (21).

270 Toutes les perceptions cependant appartiennent à des formes [aux facultés de l’âme] et se ramènent à une forme [a l’âme] qui peut devenir toutes choses (22). C’est ce qui est démontré encore par la nécessité, pour les impressions, de venir toutes aboutir à un centre unique. Sans doute les organes au moyen desquels nous percevons ne peuvent nous faire percevoir toutes choses, et par conséquent les impressions diffèrent avec les organes ; néanmoins, le jugement de ces impressions appartient à un seul et même principe, qui ressemble à un juge attentif aux paroles et aux actes soumis à son appréciation (23). Mais on a dit plus haut (24) que c’est un seul et même principe qui produit les actes appartenant à des fonctions différentes [comme le sont la vue et l’ouïe]. Si ces fonctions sont comme les sens, il n’est pas possible que chacune d’elles pense (25) ; l’Âme universelle en est 271 seule capable. Si la pensée est une fonction propre, indépendante, chaque intelligence subsiste par elle-même (26). Enfin, quand l’âme est raisonnable, et qu’elle l’est de manière
à être appelée raisonnable tout entière, ce qu’on nomme partie est conforme au tout, par conséquent n’est pas une portion du tout.

Guthrie

ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS PART OF THE WORLD-SOUL AS IS THE LOCAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS?

3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living organism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of the entire soul back of the whole animal ? This hypothesis would force us to the conclusion either that there is no soul outside of the body, or that the whole universal Soul exists entire, not in a body, but outside of the body of the world. This question deserves consideration. Let us do so by an illustration.

STUDY OF THE QUESTION BY OBSERVATION OF THE HUMAN ORGANISM.

If the universal Soul communicate herself to all individual animals, and if it be in this sense that each soul is a part of the universal Soul — for as soon as she would be divided, the universal Soul could not communicate herself to every part — the universal must be entire everywhere, and she must simultaneously be one and the same in different beings. Now this hypothesis no longer permits us to distinguish on one hand the universal Soul, and on the other the parts of this soul, so much the more as these parts have the same power (as the universal Soul); for even for organs whose functions are different, as the eyes and ears, it will not be claimed that there is one part of the soul in the eyes, and another in the ears — such a division would suit only things that have no relation with the soul. We should insist that it is the same part of the soul which animates these two different organs, exercising in each of them a different faculty. Indeed, all the powers of the soul are present in these two senses (of sight and hearing), and the only cause of the difference of their perceptions is the differences of the organs. Nevertheless all perceptions belong to forms (that is, to faculties of the soul), and reduce to a form (the soul) which can become all things (?). This is further proved by the fact that the impressions are forced to come and centre in an only centre. Doubtless the organs by means of which we perceive cannot make us perceive all things, and consequently the impressions differ with the organs. Nevertheless the judgment of these impressions belongs to one and the same principle, which resembles a judge attentive to the words and acts submitted to his consideration. We have, however, said above that it is one and the same principle which produces acts belonging to different functions (as are sight and hearing). If these functions be like the senses, it is not possible that each of them should think; for the universal alone would be capable of this. If thought be a special independent function, every intelligence subsists by itself. Further, when the soul is reasonable, and when she is so in a way such as to be called reasonable in her entirety, that which is called a part conforms to the whole, and consequently is not a part of the whole.

Taylor

III. Are parts, therefore, so to be assumed, as if some one should say, that the soul which is in the finger of a certain animal, is a part of the whole soul which is in the whole animal? This assertion, however, either leaves no soul independent of body, or admits every soul not to be in body, and contends that what is called the soul of the universe is external to the body of the world. But this must be considered; and now must be investigated by an image. For if the soul of the universe imparts itself to all partial animals, and thus each soul is a part [of the whole soul]; for if this soul were divided, it would not impart itself to each; in this case, in consequence of imparting itself wholly, it will be every where the same, being one and the same at once in many animals. After this manner, however, one soul will no longer rank as a whole, and another as a part, and especially in those things in which the same power is present. For where the employment of one thing is different from the employment of another, as in the eyes and ears, there it must not be said that one part of the soul is present to the sight, and another to the ears (for such a division as this belongs to other things), but the same part, though a different power energizes in each. For all the powers of the soul are in both the parts; but the apprehensions are different in consequence of the organs being different. Nevertheless, all the powers rank among forms, and are reduced to a form which is capable of being fashioned according to all things. This is evident from the necessity that all things should arrive at one thing [and concur in it] ; but the nature of the instruments through which the concurrence is effected, is not able to receive all things, and the passions become different in the different instruments of sensation. The judgment, however, is from the same thing, as from a judge directing his attention to what is said and done. But it has been shown, that it is every where one thing which energizes in different actions. And if the apprehensions are as sensations, it is not possible for each of the senses to understand, but the whole soul. But if intelligence is appropriate, each intellectual perception subsists through itself. And when the soul is rational, and is rational in such a way as to be denominated wholly so, then that which is called a part is the same with the whole, and is not a part of it.

MacKenna

3. Is it a question of part in the sense that, taking one living being, the soul in a finger might be called a part of the soul entire?

This would carry the alternative that either there is no soul outside of body, or that - no soul being within body - the thing described as the soul of the universe is, none the less, outside the body of the universe. That is a point to be investigated, but for the present we must consider what kind of soul this parallel would give us.

If the particular soul is a part of the All-Soul only in the sense that this bestows itself upon all living things of the partial sphere, such a self-bestowal does not imply division; on the contrary, it is the identical soul that is present everywhere, the one complete thing, multi-present at the one moment: there is no longer question of a soul that is a part against a soul that is an all - especially where an identical power is present. Even difference of function, as in eyes and ears, cannot warrant the assertion of distinct parts concerned in each separate act - with other parts again making allotment of faculty - all is met by the notion of one identical thing, but a thing in which a distinct power operates in each separate function. All the powers are present either in seeing or in hearing; the difference in impression received is due to the difference in the organs concerned; all the varying impressions are our various responses to Ideal-forms that can be taken in a variety of modes.

A further proof [of the unity of Soul] is that perception demands a common gathering place; every organ has its distinct function, and is competent only upon its own material, and must interpret each several experience in its own fashion; the judgement upon these impressions must, then, be vested in some one principle, a judge informed upon all that is said and done.

But again: "Everywhere, Unity": in the variety of functions if each "part of the soul" were as distinct as are the entrant sensations, none of those parts could have knowledge; awareness would belong only to that judging faculty - or, if local, every such act of awareness would stand quite unrelated to any other. But since the soul is a rational soul, by the very same title by which it is an All-Soul, and is called the rational soul, in the sense of being a whole [and so not merely "reasoning locally"], then what is thought of as a part must in reality be no part but the identity of an unparted thing.