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Plotino - Tratado 27,1 (IV, 3, 1) — A alma provém da alma do mundo

Enéada IV, 3, 1

segunda-feira 20 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

      

Capítulo 1, 1-16: Introdução geral: três razões para se interessar pela alma  

Capítulos 1, 16-8. Unidade   e multiplicidade da alma: refutação da tese estoica.

Capítulo 1, 16-37: Apresentação dos cinco   argumentos em favor da tese segundo a qual nossa alma provém da Alma do Mundo  , da qual ela é parte.

  • Argumento   1: esta tese é compatível com a doutrina estoica
  • Argumento 2: nossas almas são partes da Alma do Mundo, assim como nossos corpos são partes do corpo do mundo
  • Argumento 3: a influência da rotação do mundo sobre nossas almas indica que elas provêm da Alma do Mundo
  • Argumento 4: participamos da Alma do Mundo da mesma maneira que as partes de nosso corpo participam de nossa alma
  • Argumento 5: não há alma fora da Alma do Mundo, que governa tudo o que é inanimado
      

tradução

1. Seria justo ocuparmo-nos com a alma  , com todos os pontos em que nos encontramos em dificuldades sobre ela e devemos chegar a uma solução  , ou, continuando apenas nessas dificuldades, pelo menos obter essa vantagem  , que sabemos quais são os pontos difíceis. Pois o que se poderia gastar mais razoavelmente tempo   discutindo e investigando extensivamente do que isso? Há muitas outras razões para fazê-lo, e especialmente porque nos dá conhecimento em ambas as direções, das coisas das quais a alma é o princípio e daquelas das quais ela deriva. E ao investigar isso, devemos obedecer ao comando do deus   que nos incitou a conhecer a nós mesmos. E, como desejamos buscar e encontrar outras coisas, e ansiamos por alcançar a bela visão   do intelecto  , seria apropriado que busquemos a natureza real   daquilo que busca. Pois no Intelecto universal   também havia dualidade; de modo que é razoável que em coisas parciais se deva ser mais de um tipo, e de um outro. E devemos considerar como os deuses são recebidos na alma. Mas consideraremos isso quando investigarmos como a alma vem a ser em um corpo; mas agora voltemos àqueles que dizem que nossas próprias almas também vêm da alma do Todo [pantos psyches]. Pois eles, talvez, afirmem que não é argumento   suficiente para que nossas almas não sejam partes da Alma do Todo que elas também nos alcancem tanto quanto ela, e sejam intelectuais da mesma maneira (mesmo se aceitem esse "da mesma maneira"), pois partes [eles afirmarão] têm a mesma forma que seus todos. E resgatarão Platão   como sustentando esta opinião  , quando, para confirmar que o Todo   é dotado de alma, ele diz que, assim como nosso corpos são parte do Todo, assim também nossas almas são parte da Alma do Todo. E [eles vão afirmar  ] que é dito e claramente mostrado que seguimos o circuito do Todo, e derivando dele nossos caracteres e fortunas , e estando dentro do Todo, recebemos nossas almas daquilo que nos envolve. E o que em nós cada parte de nós recebe de nossa alma, da mesma maneira nós também, sendo na mesma configuração, partes em relação   à totalidade, recebemos como partes da alma em totalidade. E [eles dirão que] “toda alma se preocupa com tudo o que é sem alma” significa apenas isto, e que quando Platão disse isto ele pretendia não deixar nada mais fora da alma, além da Alma do Todo: pois esta é a alma encarregada de tudo o que é sem alma.

Míguez

1. Conviene que tratemos acerca de las dificultades relativas al alma con objeto de ponerlas en claro o, si no salimos de ellas, para conocer, al menos, en qué consisten, lo cual será ya una ganancia. ¿Qué otro objeto resultaría más adecuado para tratar, examinar y discutir? Entre otras muchas cosas, nos da el conocimiento de dos muy importantes: el de los seres de los que el alma es principio y el de aquellos otros de los que ella proviene. Obedecemos así, además, a la recomendación divina que nos prescribe que nos conozcamos a nosotros mismos [1]. Porque es claro que si queremos buscar y encontrar todas las otras cosas, esto es, si deseamos alcanzar justamente cuál es el objeto de nuestra búsqueda, hemos de entregarnos por entero a ese fin tan querido de nuestra contemplación.

Dos cosas hay que considerar en la inteligencia universal, y, con mayor motivo, en las inteligencias individuales, donde se da un sujeto que recibe y un objeto que es recibido. Hemos de examinar, naturalmente, cómo nuestra inteligencia recibe los dioses, pero esto tan sólo cuando tratemos de encontrar cómo viene el alma al cuerpo. Ahora habremos de volver una vez más a los que dicen que nuestras almas provienen del alma del universo. No es quizá suficiente prueba, dirán ellos, que nuestras almas alcancen el lugar del alma del universo, o que ésta marche al unísono con ellas, caso de que eso   sea posible, porque es lo cierto que las partes han de ser homogéneas con el todo. En su ayuda traen a Platón, el que intenta convencemos de que el universo es un ser animado: “Así como nuestro cuerpo es una parte del universo —dice—, así también nuestra alma es una parte del alma del universo” [Primero Alcibíades, 30 a]. Pero (Platón) quiere convencernos también —y lo dice y lo muestra con claridad— de que debemos seguir el movimiento circular del universo, ya que nuestro carácter y condición provienen de aquí y, nacidos además en el interior del universo, tomamos de él nuestra alma. Y así como cada parte de nosotros recibe una parte de nuestra alma, así, y por la misma razón, nosotros, que somos partes del todo, recibimos una parte del alma universal. Eso mismo quiere decir la frase de Platón: “Toda alma está al cuidado   de lo que es inanimado” [2]. De modo que no permite la existencia de ninguna otra alma, fuera del alma del universo, puesto que ésta toma a su cargo la totalidad de lo inanimado.

Bouillet

I. Nous nous proposons de déterminer ici quelles sont, parmi les questions qu’on élève sur l’âme, celles qu’on peut résoudre avec certitude, et celles sur lesquelles il faut s’en tenir au doute, en regardant ce doute même comme la récompense de ses recherches. Voilà, nous le croyons, un sujet intéressant d’étude. Qu’y a-t-il en effet qui mérite mieux d’être examiné et traité avec soin que ce qui concerne l’âme? L’étude de l’âme a, entre autres avantages, celui de nous faire connaître deux espèces de choses, celles dont elle est le principe et celles dont elle procède elle-même. C’est en nous livrant à cet examen que nous obéirons au précepte divin qui nous prescrit de nous connaître nous-mêmes. Enfin, avant de chercher à découvrir et à comprendre le reste, il est juste que nous nous appliquions d’abord à connaître quelle est la nature du principe qui fait ces recherches; et, puisque nous aspirons à ce qui est aimable, il convient que nous commencions par contempler le plus beau des spectacles [celui de notre nature intellectuelle] : car, s’il y a dualité dans l’Intelligence universelle, à plus forte   raison doit-il y avoir dualité dans les intelligences particulières. Nous avons aussi à examiner en quel sens on peut dire que les âmes sont les temples des dieux (ὑποδοχαὶ τῶν θεῶν) ; mais nous ne pourrons traiter cette question qu’après avoir déterminé comment l’âme descend dans le corps.

Maintenant, venons à ceux qui prétendent que nos âmes elles-mêmes sont des émanations de l’Âme universselle (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι  ) [3].

Ils soutiendront peut-être que, pour démontrer que nos âmes ne sont pas des parcelles de l’Âme universelle, il ne suffit pas de faire voir que nos âmes vont aussi loin [dans leur procession] que l’Âme universelle, ni qu’elles lui ressemblent par leurs facultés intellectuelles, en supposant toutefois qu’ils admettent cette ressemblance : car ils diront que les parties sont conformes au tout qu’elles composent. Ils invoqueront l’autorité de Platon et soutiendront qu’il professe cette opinion dans le passage où il affirme en ces termes que l’univers est animé : « Comme notre corps est une partie de l’univers, notre âme est une partie de l’Âme de l’univers [4]. » Platon, ajouteront-ils, dit et démontre clairement que nous suivons le mouvement circulaire du ciel, que nous en recevons nos mœurs et notre condition, qu’ayant été engendrés dans l’univers, nous devons tenir notre âme de l’univers qui nous renferme [5], et que, puisque chaque partie de nous participe de notre âme, nous devons nous-mêmes participer de l’Âme de l’univers, dont nous sommes des parties de la même manière que nos membres sont des parties de nous-mêmes. Enfin, ils citeront encore ces mots : « L’Âme universelle prend soin de tout ce qui est inanimé. » Cette phrase paraît signifier qu’il n’y a point d’âme en dehors de l’Âme universelle : car c’est elle qui prend soin de tout ce qui est inanimé.

Guthrie

PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT "KNOW THYSELF," AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY.

1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our researches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt. This should prove an interesting study. What indeed better deserves careful examination and close scrutiny than what refers to the soul? Among other advantages, the study of the soul has that of making known to us two order of things, those of which she is the principle, and those from which she herself proceeds. This examination will be in line with the divine precept to "know ourselves." Before seeking to discover and understand the remainder, it is no more than right first to apply ourselves to finding out the nature of the principle that embarks in these researches; and as we are seeking what is lovable, we will do well   to contemplate the most beautiful of spectacles (that of our own intellectual nature); for if there be a duality, in the universal (Soul), so much more likely will there be a duality in individual intelligences. We should also examine the sense   in which it may be said that souls are sanctuaries of the divinity; but this question will not admit of solution till after we have determined how the soul descends into the body.

ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS EMANATIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL?

Now we must consider whether our souls themselves are (emanations) from the universal Soul. It may be insisted that, to demonstrate that our souls are not particles of the universal Soul, it does not suffice to show that our souls go as far (in their procession) as the universal Soul, nor that they resemble (the universal Soul) in their intellectual faculties, granting indeed that such a resemblance be admitted; for we might say that parts conform to the whole they compose. We might invoke Plato’s authority, and insist that he teaches this opinion in that (part of the Philebus  ) where he affirms that the universe is animate: "As our body is a part of the universe, our soul is a part of the Soul of the universe." We might add that (Plato) states and clearly demonstrates that we follow the circular movement of heaven, that from it we receive, our moral habits and condition; that as we were begotten in the universe, our soul must be derived from the surrounding universe; and as each part of us participates in our soul, we ourselves should participate in the Soul of the universe, of which we are parts in the same way as our members are parts of ourselves. Last, we might quote the following words: "The universal Soul takes care of all that is inanimate." This sentence seems to mean that there is no soul outside of the universal Soul; for it is the latter that cares for all that is inanimate.

MacKennna

1. The soul: what dubious questions concerning it admit of solution, or where we must abide   our doubt - with, at least, the gain of recognizing the problem that confronts us - this is matter well worth attention. On what subject can we more reasonably expend the time required by minute discussion and investigation? Apart from much else, it is enough that such an enquiry illuminates two grave questions: of what sphere the soul is the principle, and whence the soul itself springs. Moreover, we will be only obeying the ordinance of the God who bade us know ourselves.

Our general instinct to seek and learn, our longing to possess ourselves of whatsoever is lovely in the vision will, in all reason, set us enquiring into the nature of the instrument with which we search.

Now even in the universal Intellect [Divine Mind  ] there was duality, so that we would expect differences of condition in things of part: how some things rather than others come to be receptacles of the divine beings will need to be examined; but all this we may leave aside until we are considering the mode in which soul comes to occupy body. For the moment we return to our argument against those who maintain our souls to be offshoots from the soul of the universe [parts and an identity modally parted].

Our opponents will probably deny the validity of our arguments against the theory that the human soul is a mere segment of the All-Soul - the considerations, namely, that it is of identical scope, and that it is intellective in the same degree, supposing them, even, to admit that equality of intellection.

They will object that parts must necessarily fall under one ideal-form with their wholes. And they will adduce Plato as expressing their view where, in demonstrating that the All is ensouled, he says "As our body is a portion of the body of the All, so our soul is a portion of the soul of the All." It is admitted on clear evidence that we are borne along by the Circuit of the All; we will be told that - taking character and destiny from it, strictly inbound with it - we must derive our souls, also, from what thus bears us up, and that as within ourselves every part absorbs from our soul so, analogically, we, standing as parts to the universe, absorb from the Soul of the All as parts of it. They will urge also that the dictum "The collective soul cares for all the unensouled," carries the same implication and could be uttered only in the belief that nothing whatever of later origin stands outside the soul of the universe, the only soul there can be there to concern itself with the unensouled.

Taylor

I. Is it necessary to consider such doubts as pertain to the soul as sufficiently solved ; or shall we say that the doubts themselves are accompanied with this gain, that to know the difficulty [aporia  ] with which they are attended, will be a right discussion of the affair ? For what can any one reasonably more abundantly consider and discuss than this; both on many other accounts, and also because it contributes to the knowledge of those things of which it is the principle, and of those from which it is derived ? By so doing, likewise, we shall comply with the mandate of the God who calls upon us to know ourselves. And since we wish to investigate and discover other things, it is but just to enquire what this is which investigates, especially since we desire to apprehend that which is lovely in the objects of contemplation. For in every intellect there is that which is twofold ; [6] so that in partial intellects it is reasonable to admit that one has [the intelligible] in a greater, but another in a less degree. It is likewise requisite to consider, how souls become the receptacles of the Gods ; but this, indeed, we shall discuss when we investigate how soul subsists in body. Now, therefore, again, let us return to those who assert that our souls also are derived from the soul of the universe. For perhaps they will say it is not sufficient [in order to establish this hypothesis  ,] that our souls extend as far as the soul of the universe, nor that they are similarly intellectual with it; since parts are of a similar species with their wholes. They will, likewise, adduce Plato [7] as the patron of this opinion, when proving that the universe is animated, he says: "As our body is a part of the body of the universe, thus also our soul is a part of the soul of the universe." This, too, is confirmed by the assertion, that we follow the circulation of the universe. And it is clearly asserted and demonstrated that our manners and fortunes are thence derived; and that as we are generated within the world, we receive our soul from the universe in which we are comprehended. Farther still, as each part of us partakes of our soul, so likewise we for the same reason, since we have the relation of parts to the whole, participate as parts of the soul of the universe. The assertion [of Plato in the Phaedrus  ] likewise, that every soul pays a guardian attention to every thing inanimate, has the same signification, and does not leave any thing else externally of soul, after the soul of the universe. For it is this soul which pays attention to every thing inanimate.


Ver online : ENÉADAS III-IV (Gredos)


Après avoir, dans les deux livres précédents, déterminé en général l’essence de l’âme, Plotin traite ici quelques-unes des principales questions que soulèvent sa nature et l’exercice de ses facultés : 1° Toutes les âmes ne sont-elles que les parties ou les émanations d’une seule Âme (§ 1-8)? 2° Pour quelle cause et de quelle manière l’âme descend-elle dans le corps (§9-17)? 3° L’âme fait-elle usage de la raison discursive quand elle est hors du corps (§18)? 4° Comment l’âme est-elle à la fois divisible et indivisible (§ 19)? 5° Quels sont les rapports de l’âme avec le corps (§ 20-23)? 6° Où va l’âme après la mort (§ 24) ? 7° Quelles sont les conditions de l’exercice de la mémoire et de l’imagination (§ 25-32) ? [BOUILLET]


[1Es una clara referencia a la máxima adoptada por Sócrates y dada a conocer repetidamente a sus discípulo. En el Primero Alcibíades, 130 e, dice Sócrates: “Al prescribírsenos el conocimiento de ‘sí mismo’ lo que se nos ordena es el conocimiento de nuestra alma”.

[2La frase aparece en el Fedro, 246 b. Tradução a partir de Armstrong: toda alma cuida por tudo que é sem alma [psychon, inanimado].

[6viz. The intelligible and the intellectual

[7See his “ Philebus ” and “ Timaeus.”