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ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 45,1 (III, 7, 1) — Tempo e eternidade - preâmbulo

Enéada III, 7, 1

quinta-feira 20 de janeiro de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 1: Preâmbulo

  • 1-6 : Diferença entre o preconceito imediato e o conhecimento discursivo do tempo e da eternidade.
  • 7-16 : Não se deve contentar em repetir os discursos dos antigos sobre o tempo e a eternidade.
  • 16-24 : Colocação metodológica: o exame da eternidade deverá preceder o exame do tempo.

Míguez

1. Dícese que la eternidad y el tiempo son dos cosas diferentes, pues la eternidad se da en la naturaleza que permanece siempre, y el tiempo, en cambio, en todo aquello que nace y en nuestro universo sensible. Al hablar así, creemos que espontáneamente y de una vez, por una especie de intuición del pensamiento, nos forjamos de nosotros mismos en nuestras almas una impresión muy clara de estos dos objetos, impresión que repetímos siempre y a propósito de todas las cosas. Por el contrario, si intentamos hacer un examen más detenido y tratar las cosas más de cerca, nos sentimos en la incertidumbre y consideramos las opiniones de los antiguos sobre este particular, las cuales, ciertamente, difieren en cierto sentido, pero son idénticas en otro. Con ello cesamos en nuestra investigación y nos damos ya por satisfechos, si se nos pide que manifestemos cuál es la opinión de aquéllos; ya plenamente complacidos, nos abstenemos entonces de la búsqueda. Parece como si debiéramos pensar que la verdad fue descubierta por algunos de los antiguos y esclarecidos filósofos. Conviene que examinemos, sin embarco, quiénes son sobre todo los que han alcanzado la verdad y cómo podremos llegar nosotros al conocimiento de todo esto.

Convendrá examinar primeramente lo que es la eternidad, en la opinión de los que afirman que difiere del tiempo, porque, sí conocemos la eternidad inmóvil del modelo, conoceremos también, y de modo más claro, su imagen, ya que se dice que el tiempo es una imagen de la eternidad [1]. Si nos imaginamos lo que es el tiempo antes de haber contemplado la eternidad, podríamos, siguiendo el recuerdo, ir de lo sensible a lo inteligible para representarnos aquello con lo que el tiempo tiene semejanza, si es verdad que el tiempo se parece a la eternidad.

Bouillet

Quand nous disons que l’Éternité et le Temps sont deux choses différentes, que l’Éternité se rapporte à ce qui existe perpétuellement, et le Temps à ce qui devient, nous l’affirmons spontanément en quelque sorte, d’après les intuitions immédiates de notre pensée, d’après la notion instinctive que notre âme en possède naturellement, de telle sorte que notre langage est invariable sur ce sujet. Mais, quand nous essayons d’approfondir et de préciser nos idées, nous nous trouvons embarrassés [2] : nous interprétons différemment les diverses opinions professées par les anciens et souvent une même opinion. Pour nous, nous nous bornerons à examiner ces opinions, et nous croyons que, pour remplir notre tâché, il suffira que nous répondions à toutes les questions en expliquant la doctrine des anciens, sans rien chercher au delà. Il faut certainement admettre que quelques-uns des philosophes anciens, de ces hommes bienheureux, sont parvenus à trouver la vérité. Reste à déterminer quels sont ceux qui l’ont trouvée et comment nous pouvons saisir nous-mêmes leur pensée.

Nous avons d’abord à examiner en quoi font consister l’éternité ceux qui la regardent comme différente du temps : car, en connaissant le modèle, nous aurons une conception plus nette de son image que l’on appelle le temps [3]. Si l’on se représente le temps avant de contempler l’éternité, on peut par la réminiscence s’élever d’ici-bas à la contemplation du modèle auquel le temps ressemble, puisqu’il en est l’image.

Guthrie

INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES.

(1.) When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity refers to perpetual existence, and time to what "becomes" (this visible world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and common language supports these forms of expression. When however we try to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail, we become embarrassed; the different opinions of ancient philosophers, and often even the same opinions, are interpreted differently. We however shall limit ourselves to an examination of these opinions, and we believe that we can fulfil our task of answering all questions by explaining the teachings of the ancient philosophers, without starting any minute disquisition of our own. We do indeed insist that some of these ancient philosophers, these blessed men have achieved the truth. It remains only to decide which of them have done so, and how we ourselves can grasp their thought.

ETERNITY IS THE MODEL OF ITS IMAGE, TIME.

First, we have to examine that of which eternity consists, according to those who consider it as different from time; for, by gaining a conception of the model (eternity), we shall more clearly understand its image called time. If then, before observing eternity, we form a conception of time, we may, by reminiscence, from here below, rise to the contemplation of the model to which time, as its image, resembles.

MacKenna

1. Eternity and Time; two entirely separate things, we explain "the one having its being in the everlasting Kind, the other in the realm of Process, in our own Universe"; and, by continually using the words and assigning every phenomenon to the one or the other category, we come to think that, both by instinct and by the more detailed attack of thought, we hold an adequate experience of them in our minds without more ado.

When, perhaps, we make the effort to clarify our ideas and close into the heart of the matter we are at once unsettled: our doubts throw us back upon ancient explanations; we choose among the various theories, or among the various interpretations of some one theory, and so we come to rest, satisfied, if only we can counter a question with an approved answer, and glad to be absolved from further enquiry.

Now, we must believe that some of the venerable philosophers of old discovered the truth; but it is important to examine which of them really hit the mark and by what guiding principle we can ourselves attain to certitude.

What, then, does Eternity really mean to those who describe it as something different from Time? We begin with Eternity, since when the standing Exemplar is known, its representation in image - which Time is understood to be - will be clearly apprehended - though it is of course equally true, admitting this relationship to Time as image to Eternity the original, that if we chose to begin by identifying Time we could thence proceed upwards by Recognition [the Platonic Anamnesis] and become aware of the Kind which it images.

Taylor

I. With respect to eternity and time, we say that each of these is different from the other, and that one of them indeed is conversant with a perpetual nature, but the other about that which is generated. We also think that we have a certain clear perception of these in our souls spontaneously, and, as it were, from the more collected projections of intellectual conception; always and every where calling these by the same appellations. When, however, we endeavour to accede to the inspection of these, and to approach as it were nearer to them, again we are involved in doubt, admitting some of the decisions of the ancients about these, and rejecting others, and perhaps receiving differently the same decisions. Resting also in these, and thinking it sufficient if when interrogated we are able to relate the opinion of the ancients concerning time and eternity, we are liberated from any farther investigation about them. It is necessary, therefore, to think that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers have discovered the truth; but it is fit to consider who those are that have obtained it, and after what manner we also may acquire the same knowledge on these subjects. In the first place, however, it is requisite to investigate what those conceive eternity to be, who admit that it is different from time.

For that which is established as the paradigm being known, that also which is the image of it, and which they say is time, will perhaps become manifest. But if some one, prior to the survey of eternity, should imagine what time is, it will happen to him, proceeding from hence thither by reminiscence, that he will behold the nature to which time is assimilated, if the latter has a similitude to the former.


Ver online : ENÉADAS III-IV (Gredos)


[1Referencia precisa al Timeo, Tim 37d.

[2Saint Augustin a dit de même, mais avec plus de vivacité : « Quid est tempus ? Si nemo a me quœrat, scio ; si quœrenti explicare velim, nescio. » (Confessiones, XI, 14.)

[3Cette nature éternelle de l’animal intelligible , il n’était pas possible de la donner complètement à ce qui a commencé. Mais Dieu invente une image mobile de l’éternité , et en même temps qu’il met l’ordre dans le ciel, il forme, sur le modèle de l’éternité immuable dans l’unité, l’image de l’éternité marchant suivant le nombre, et c’est là ce que nous avons nommé le temps. » (Platon, Timée, p. 37; trad. de M. H. Martin, p. 103.) Saint Augustin a exprimé la même pensée dans les termes suivants : « Quœ ergo superiora sunt, nisi illa in quibus summa, inconcussa, incommutabilis, œterna, manet aequalitas? Ubi nullum est tempus, quia nulla mutabilitas est ; et unde tempora fabricantur et ordinantur et modiflcantur aeternitatem imitantia, dum cœli conversio ad idem redit, et cœlestia corpora ad idem revocat, diebusque et mensibus et annis et lustris, ceterisque siderum orbibus, legibus œqualitatis et unitatis et ordinationis obtemperet. » (De Musica, VI, 11.)