Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 26,16 (III, 6, 16) — A matéria e a dimensão: o problema da (...)

ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 26,16 (III, 6, 16) — A matéria e a dimensão: o problema da grandeza

Enéada III, 6, 16

segunda-feira 23 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

      

Capítulo 16: A matéria e a dimensão: o problema da grandeza  

  • 1-5: A razão formal dá uma tamanho à matéria, por ela mesma inesperada
  • 5-8: A matéria não guarda nada da grandeza dos corpos que nela vêm
  • 8-15: Resposta   a uma objeção: a matéria nada pode devir
  • 15-20: A matéria tem o tamanho do universo   sem que isso o afete
  • 21-24: Diferença dos seres que experienciam e daqueles que não experienciam
  • 24-32: A matéria participa à grandeza, como às outras qualidades, sem aí participar
      

Míguez

16. Una cierta razón que viene a ella le da la extensión que quiere y hace así, por sí misma, la materia grande, rodeándola de una magnitud que la materia no tenía, Con ello, la materia no se hace grande por sí misma, sino que la magnitud se instala en ella. Si se suprimiese de ella esta forma, el sustrato material no tendría magnitud ni se aparecer  ía como grande. Si, por ejemplo, el ser   dotado de magnitud es un hombre o un caballo, y si, con ía forma del caballo, su magnitud ha venido a la materia, una vez desaparecido el caballo desaparece con él su magnitud. Al que dijese que el caballo está hecho de una cierta masa y de una determinada magnitud, que sigue subsistiendo después de él, responderíamos que lo que ahora subsiste no es la magnitud del caballo, sino la magnitud de la masa. Si esta masa es fuego o tierra, digamos que su magnitud desaparece una vez desaparecido eí fuego, cosa que también acontece con la tierra. No posee, pues, ni la forma ni ía magnitud; o ninguna otra cosa podrá venir del fuego, sino que permanecerá siendo sin hacerse fuego.

La materia tiene ahora tal magnitud que parece igualar a la del universo  . Pero si el cielo   y todo lo que hay en él dejasen de existir, toda su magnitud se iría entonces con ellos, al igual que las otras cualidades de la materia; y ésta, naturalmente, retendría lo que ella es, sin conservar, en cambio, ninguna de las cosas que antes poseía. Sin embargo, los objetos que experimentan alguna cosa con la pi’csencía de otros, incluso desaparecidos éstos, conservan algo de lo que recibieron. Aunque no ocurre así con todos los objetos, como, por ejemplo, con el aire iluminado, que no conserva nada cuando la luz desaparece.

Hay motivos para admirarse de que la materia sea grande sin poseer la magnitud, o cálida sin poseer el calor. Y es que el ser de la magnitud no es el mismo que el de la materia, ya que la magnitud es, como la forma, inmaterial. Si conservamos la materia, será ella todas las cosas por participación, y una de estas cosas la magnitud. En los cuerpos compuestos se da la magnitud junto con las otras propiedades; pero no es algo determinado, puesto que la magnitud asienta en la razón de un cuerpo. En la materia no se da lo indeterminado  , puesto que la materia no es un cuerpo.

Bouillet

XVI. La raison [séminale], en s’approchant de la mati  ère et lui donnant l’extension qu’elle a voulu, en a fait une grandeur (83) ; elle a tiré d’elle-même la grandeur pour la donner à la matière, qui ne ta possédait pas et qui n’est pas pour cela devenue grande ; sinon, la grandeur qui se trouverait en elle serait la grandeur même. Si on ôte à la matière la forme, le sujet qui reste alors n’est plus et ne paraît plus grand [puisque la grandeur fait partie delà forme]. Si ce qui est produit dans la matière est une certaine grandeur, un homme, par exemple, ou un cheval, la grandeur propre au cheval disparaît avec la forme même du cheval (84). Si l’on dit qu’un cheval ne peut se produire que dans une masse d’une grandeur déterminée, et que cette grandeur demeure [quand la forme du cheval , nous répondrons que ce n’est pas la grandeur propre au cheval qui demeure alors, mais la grandeur de la masse. Et encore, si cette masse est du feu ou de la terre, quand la forme du feu ou celle de la terre disparaît, la grandeur du feu ou celle de la terre disparaît en même temps. La matière ne possède donc ni la figure ni la quantité ; autrement, de feu elle ne deviendrait pas autre chose, mais, demeurant feu, elle ne deviendrait jamais feu (85). Maintenant qu’elle paraît être devenue aussi grande que cet univers, si le ciel était anéanti avec tout ce qu’il contient, toute quantité disparaîtrait de la matière en même temps (86), et avec la quantité s’évanouiraient aussi les autres qualités qui en sont inséparables. La matière resterait ainsi ce qu’elle était primitivement par elle-même : elle ne garderait rien des choses qui existent en elle (87). En effet, les objets qui sont susceptibles de pâtir par la présence d’objets contraires peuvent, quand ceux-ci s’éloignent, en garder quelque trace; mais ce qui est impassible ne retient rien : par exemple, l’air pénétré par la lumière n’en garde rien quand celle-ci disparaît (88). Si l’on s’étonne que ce qui n’a pas de grandeur puisse devenir grand, nous demanderons à notre tour comment ce qui n’a pas de chaleur peut devenir chaud. En effet, autre chose est pour la matière d’être matière, autre chose d’être grandeur ; la grandeur est immatérielle comme la figure. Si nous conservons la matière telle qu’elle est, nous devons dire qu’elle est toutes choses par participation. Or la grandeur fait partie de ce que nous nommons toutes choses. Les corps étant composés, la grandeur s’y trouve avec les autres qualités, sans y être cependant déterminée. En effet, la raison au corps contient aussi la grandeur (89). La matière au contraire ne contient même pas la grandeur indéterminée, parce qu’elle n’est pas un corps (90).

Guthrie

THE MAGNITUDE OF MATTER IS REALLY DERIVED FROM THE SEMINAL REASON.

16. The ("seminal) reason," on approaching matter, and giving it the extension it desired, made of it a magnitude. The "reason" drew from itself the magnitude to give it to the matter, which did not possess it, and which did not, merely on that account, acquire size; otherwise the magnitude occurring within it would be magnitude itself. If we remove form from matter, the substrate that then remains neither seems nor is large (since magnitude is part of form). If what is produced in matter be a certain magnitude, as for instance a man or a horse, the magnitude characteristic of the horse disappears with the form of the horse. If we say that a horse cannot be produced except in a mass of determined size, and that this magnitude remained (when the form of the horse disappeared), we woud answer that what would then remain would not be the magnitude characteristic of the horse, but the magnitude of mass. Besides, if this mass were fire or earth, when the form of fire or that of earth disappeared, the magnitude of the fire or of the earth would simultaneously disappear. Matter therefore possesses neither figure nor quantity; otherwise, it would not have ceased being fire to become something else, but, remaining fire, would never "become" fire. Now that it seems to have become as great as this universe, if the heavens, with all they contain were annihilated, all quantity would simultaneously disappear out of matter, and with quantity also the other inseparable qualities will disappear. Matter would then remain what it originally was by itself; it would keep none of the things that exist within it. Indeed, the objects that can be affected by the presence of contrary objects can, when the latter withdraw, keep some trace of them; but that which is impassible retains nothing; for instance, the air, when penetrated by the light  , retains none of it when it disappears. That that which has no magnitude can become great is not any more surprising than that which has no heat can become hot. Indeed, for matter to be matter is something entirely different from its being magnitude; magnitude is as immaterial as figure. Of matter such as it really is we should say that it is all things by participation. Now magnitude forms part of what we call all things. As the bodies are composite, magnitude is there among the other qualities, without however being determinate therein. Indeed, the "reason" of the body also contains magnitude. On the contrary, matter does not even contain indeterminate magnitude, because it is not a body.

Taylor

XVI. Moreover, a certain reason acceding and extending matter as far as it proceeds into it, causes it to be great, investing it from itself with greatness, which is not in matter. But matter does not through this become quantity ; for if it did, that which is great in it would be magnitude. If, therefore, some one takes away this form, the subject no longer is, nor will appear to be great. But if that which is generated was great, man and horse, and together with horse the magnitude of horse which accedes, would depart on the departure of horse. If, however, it should be said, that horse is generated in a certain great bulk and of a certain extent, and that the magnitude remains, we reply that it is not the magnitude of the horse, but the magnitude of the bulk which there remains. Nevertheless, if this bulk is fire or earth, on the departure of fire or earth, the magnitude of fire or of earth will also depart. Matter, therefore, will neither enjoy figure, nor magnitude; for otherwise it would not be something else from fire, but remaining fire, it would not become fire. Hence, matter having now become as we see, as great in extent as the universe, if the heavens should cease to exist and’all they contain, together with these, all magnitude would likewise depart from matter, and at the same time all other qualities, and matter would be left that which it was before, preserving no one of the things which had a prior subsistence about it. In the natures, however, which suffer by the presence of certain things, something is still left in the recipients, when those things depart; but this is no longer the case with natures that do not suffer. Thus the air which is surrounded with light, retains nothing of the light when it departs. But if some one should wonder how it is possible, that a thing should become great which does not possess magnitude; it may also be doubted how that can become hot which has not heat. For it is not the same thing in matter, to be matter and to be magnitude; since magnitude is immaterial, in the same manner as figure is immaterial. And if we preserve matter, we must assert that it is all things by participation. But magnitude is one of all things. In bodies, therefore, which are composites, there is magnitude together with other things, yet it is not indefinite; since in the definition of body magnitude also is included. But in matter, even indefinite magnitude is not included; for it is not body.

MacKenna

16. An Ideal-Principle approaches and leads Matter towards some desired dimension, investing this non-existent underlie with a magnitude from itself which never becomes incorporate - for Matter, if it really incorporated magnitude, would be a mass.

Eliminate this Ideal-Form and the substratum ceases to be a thing of magnitude, or to appear so: the mass produced by the Idea   was, let us suppose, a man or a horse; the horse-magnitude came upon the Matter when a horse was produced upon it; when the horse ceases to exist upon the Matter, the magnitude of the horse departs also. If we are told that the horse implies a certain determined bulk and that this bulk is a permanent thing, we answer that what is permanent in this case is not the magnitude of the horse but the magnitude of mass in general. That same Magnitude might be fire or earth; on their disappearance their particular magnitudes would disappear with them. Matter, then, can never take to itself either pattern or magnitude; if it did, it would no longer be able to turn from being fire, let us say, into being something else; it would become and be fire once for all.

In a word, though Matter is far extended - so vastly as to appear co-extensive with all this sense  -known Universe - yet if the Heavens and their content came to an end, all magnitude would simultaneously pass from Matter with, beyond a doubt, all its other properties; it would be abandoned to its own Kind, retaining nothing of all that which, in its own peculiar mode, it had hitherto exhibited.

Where an entrant force can effect modification it will inevitably leave some trace upon its withdrawal; but where there can be no modification, nothing can be retained; light comes and goes  , and the air is as it always was.

That a thing essentially devoid of magnitude should come to a certain size is no more astonishing than that a thing essentially devoid of heat should become warm: Matter’s essential existence is quite separate from its existing in bulk, since, of course, magnitude is an immaterial principle as pattern is. Besides, if we are not to reduce Matter to nothing, it must be all things by way of participation, and Magnitude is one of those all things.

In bodies, necessarily compounds, Magnitude though not a determined Magnitude must be present as one of the constituents; it is implied in the very notion of body; but Matter - not a Body - excludes even undetermined Magnitude.