Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 26,8 (III, 6, 8) — Em diálogo com Aristóteles: uma realidade (...)

ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 26,8 (III, 6, 8) — Em diálogo com Aristóteles: uma realidade não sofre a não ser de seu contrário

Enéada III, 6, 8

domingo 22 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 8: Em diálogo com Aristóteles: uma realidade não sofre a não ser de seu contrário

  • 1-3: Retomada do princípio aristotélico, a afeição supões a contrariedade no interior de um gênero
  • 3-9: Exemplo do quente e do frio, do seco e do úmido. Caso mais particular do fogo
  • 9-12: A alteração conduz à destruição. Indestrutível, a matéria é também inalterável
  • 12-20: As qualidades sensíveis se afetam mutuamente. A questão da presença das qualidades "na" matéria resta a precisar

Míguez

8. De una manera general, el ser que sufre debe contar con potencias y cualidades opuestas a las de las cosas que se introducen en él para hacerle sufrir. Así, para el calor que hay en un ser la alteración viene dada por algo que lo enfría, lo mismo que para la humedad por un objeto que lo deseca, Decimos que un sujeto sufre una alteración cuando de cálido pasa a frío o de seco pasa a húmedo. Eso testimonia la llamada corrupción del fuego, por su cambio en otro elemento. Decimos que es el fuego el que se corrompe y no la materia, de modo que hay pasividad allí donde se da la corrupción; un camino hacia ella lo ofrece precisamente la recepción de la pasión, porque la corrupción alcanza a todo sujeto que sufre pasiones.

La materia, ciertamente, no puede ser destruida, porque entonces, ¿en qué y cómo se cambiaría? Recibiendo como recibe tanto el calor como el frío y otras infinitas cualidades que se apoderan de ella y le son connaturales, mezclándose en tal sentido unas con otras, porque realmente no están separadas, ¿cómo no ha de sufrir la materia, si se encuentra en medio de unas cualidades que también sufren, por la acción recíproca que ejercen las unas sobre las otras a consecuencia de la mezcla? De otro modo, habría que situar la materia fuera de estas cualidades; mas, si una cualidad se da en un sujeto, no puede pertenecer a él sin darle algo de sí misma.

Bouillet

VIII. Il est absolument nécessaire que ce qui pâtit ait des puissances et des qualités opposées aux choses qui s’en approchent et le font pâtir. Ainsi, c’est le froid qui altère la chaleur d’un objet, l’humidité qui altère la sécheresse, et nous disons que la substance est altérée quand de chaude elle devient froide, et de sèche, humide (57). Une autre preuve de cette vérité, c’est la destruction du feu qui, en changeant, devient un autre élément. Nous disons alors que c’est le feu qui a été détruit et non la matière. Ce qui pâtit est donc ce qui est détruit : car c’est toujours une modification passive qui occasionne la destruction. Il en résulte qu’être détruit et pâtir sont deux choses inséparables. Or il est impossible que la matière soit détruite : car comment serait-elle détruite et en quoi se changerait-elle ?

Mais, dira-t-on, la matière reçoit la chaleur, le froid, des qualités nombreuses et même innombrables ; elle est caractérisée par elles, elle les possède comme inhérentes en quelque sorte à sa nature et mêlées les unes aux autres (puisqu’elles n’existent pas isolément) ; servant ainsi de milieu à l’action que les qualités exercent les unes sur les autres par leur mixtion (58), comment la matière pourrait-elle ne point pâtir avec elles (59) ? II faudrait, pour qu’elle fût impassible, la placer en quelque sorte en dehors des qualités. Mais toute qualité qui est présente dans un sujet ne peut y être présente sans lui communiquer quelque chose d’elle-même. [Voici notre réponse.]

Guthrie

SINCE MATTER CANNOT BE DESTROYED, IT CANNOT BE AFFECTED.

8. (According to Aristotle  ), it is absolutely necessary that what can be affected must have powers and qualities opposed to the things that approach it, and affect it. Thus, it is the cold that alters the heat of an object, and humidity that alters its dryness, and we say that the substrate is altered, when it ceases being hot, and grows cold; and ceasing to be dry, becomes humid. Another proof of this truth is the destruction of the fire that, by changing, becomes another element. Then we say that it is the fire, but not the matter that has been destroyed. What is affected is therefore that which is destroyed; for it is always a passive modification that occasions destruction. Consequently being destroyed and being affected are inseparable notions. Now it is impossible for matter to be destroyed; for how could it be destroyed, and in what would it change?

OBJECTION THAT MATTER MUST BE PASSIBLE IF ITS QUALITIES CHANGE AS THEY DO.

It may be objected that matter receives heat, cold, and numerous, or even innumerable qualities; it is characterized by them, it possesses them as somehow inherent in its nature, and mingled with each other, as they do not exist in isolated condition. How could nature avoid being affected along with them, serving as it does as a medium for the mutual action of these qualities by their mixture ? If matter is to be considered impassible, we shall have to consider it as somehow outside of these qualities. But every quality which is present in a subject cannot be present in it without communicating to it something of itself.

Taylor

VIII. In short, that which suffers ought to be a thing of this kind, so that it may be as it were in the contrary powers and qualities of the things which accede and produce passion. For to the inherent heat the change in quality is from that which refrigerates; and to the inherent humidity the change is from that which causes dryness. And we say that the subject is changed in quality, when from being cold it becomes hot, or moist from being dry. But what is called the corruption of fire, testifies the truth of this, the mutation being made into another element. For we say that the fire and not the matter is corrupted; so that passions are about that, about which corruption also subsists. For the reception of passion is the path to corruption; and to be corrupted pertains to that to which likewise it belongs to suffer. It is not however possible, that matter should be corrupted. For into what, and how can it be corrupted ? But is not matter [it may be said] co-passive, since qualities in their mixture with each other suffer, and matter receives in itself myriads of heats and colds, and in short infinite qualities, and is distinguished by these, and has them as it were connascent and mingled with each other ? For each of these is not separate from the rest, and matter is left in the middle of them. Unless perhaps some one should place it external to them. But everything which is in a subject, is in such a manner present with the subject, as to impart something to it from itself.

MacKenna

8. It is a general principle that, to be modified, an object must be opposed in faculty, and in quality to the forces that enter and act upon it.

Thus where heat is present, the change comes by something that chills, where damp by some drying agency: we say a subject is modified when from warm it becomes cold, from dry wet.

A further evidence is in our speaking of a fire being burned out, when it has passed over into another element; we do not say that the Matter has been burned out: in other words, modification affects what is subject to dissolution; the acceptance of modification is the path towards dissolution; susceptibility to modification and susceptibility to dissolution go necessarily together. But Matter can never be dissolved. What into? By what process?

Still: Matter harbours heat, cold, qualities beyond all count; by these it is differentiated; it holds them as if they were of its very substance and they blend within it - since no quality is found isolated to itself - Matter lies there as the meeting ground of all these qualities with their changes as they act and react in the blend: how, then, can it fail to be modified in keeping? The only escape would be to declare Matter utterly and for ever apart from the qualities it exhibits; but the very notion of Substance implies that any and every thing present in it has some action upon it.