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Plotino - Tratado 47,14 (III, 2, 14) — A ordem do universo deriva do Intelecto

Enéada III, 2, 14

sábado 28 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap. 14: A ordem do universo deriva do Intelecto; os vivos daqui são tão perfeitos quanto possível.

Míguez

14- El orden de que hablamos está de acuerdo con la razón, sin que provenga por ello de un acto reflexivo. Y, siendo tal como es, resulta verdaderamente admirable que, aun pudiendo usar de la más perfecta reflexión, no se hubiese alcanzado a realizar nada mejor que lo que conocemos. Este orden es siempre, en todos sus detalles, un orden más inteligible que reflexivo. Y si hay géneros de cosas sujetas siempre al devenir, no debe acusarse de ello a la razón que las hizo, si no se estima que estas mismas cosas han de ser como esos seres no sujetos al devenir y eternos, que se cuentan entre los más inteligibles y sensibles. Entonces, claro está, pídese para ellos un complemento de bien, no considerando suficiente lo que la naturaleza ha dado a cada ser. Y así, surgirá la queja de que un animal no tiene cuernos sin pararse a pensar que la razón no puede extenderse de la misma manera a todas las cosas, sino que conviene que lo que es menor se dé en lo que es mayor y que las partes se contengan en el todo, con lo cual aquéllas no pueden igualarse a éste, a menos que dejen de ser partes.

En el mundo inteligible todo ser es todas las cosas, en tanto en nuestro mundo cada ser no es todas las cosas. El hombre, siendo como es una parte del mundo, es una de estas cosas, pero no el hombre en su totalidad. Si hubiese en alguna parte del mundo un ser que no fuese parte, esa parte ya sería un todo. He aquí, pues, que no hemos de pedir al ser particular que llegue a la cima de la virtud, porque en ese caso no sería ya una parte del todo. Ni hemos de admitir asimismo que el universo siente envidia por el ornato de sus partes y el aumento de su valor, porque el ornato y el aumento de valor de éstas hacen al universo mucho más bello. La alta estimación de las partes se origina por su semejanza, sumisión y adaptación al todo; con ello puede haber, en el lugar que ocupan los hombres, una luz que brille, al igual que ocurre con los astros en el cielo. Desde aquí, en efecto, la visión que tenemos del cielo es la de una grande y hermosa estatua, dotada de vida y engendrada por el arte de Hefaisto: los astros resplandecen sobre su rostro, sobre su pecho y dondequiera que convenga colocarlos.

Bouillet

XIV. L’ordre de l’univers est conforme à l’Intelligence divine sans impliquer que son auteur ait eu besoin pour cela de faire aucun raisonnement. Cependant, cet ordre est si parfait que celui qui sait le mieux raisonner serait étonné de voir qu’avec le raisonnement on ne pourrait arriver à un plan meilleur que celui qu’on voit toujours réalisé dans les natures particulières, et que ce plan est plus conforme aux lois   de l’Intelligence que celui qu’on trouverait avec le raisonnement (102). Dans aucune espèce des choses qui naissent il n’est donc juste d’accuser la Raison qui produit toutes choses (ὁ ποιῶν λόγος), ni de réclamer, pour les êtres dont l’existence a commencé, la perfection des êtres dont l’existence n’a pas commencé et qui sont éternels, soit dans le monde intelligible, soit même dans le monde sensible. Ce serait vouloir que chaque être possédât plus de bien qu’il n’en comporte et regarder comme insuffisante la forme qui lui a été donnée (103) ; ce serait se plaindre, par exemple; de ce que l’homme n’a pas de cornes, et ne pas remarquer que, si la liaison a dû se répandre partout, il fallait cependant qu’une grande chose en contint de moindres, que dans le tout il y eût des parties, et que celles-ci ne sauraient être égales au tout sans cesser d’être des parties. Dans le monde intelligible chaque chose est toutes choses; mais, ici-bas, chaque chose n’est pas toutes choses. L’homme particulier n’a pas les mêmes propriétés que l’homme universel. Car, si les êtres particuliers avaient quelque chose qui ne fût pas particulier, alors ils seraient universels. Il ne faut pas demander qu’un être particulier possède comme tel la plus haute perfection ; car alors ce ne serait plus un être particulier (104). Sans doute la beauté de la partie n’est pas incompatible avec celle du tout : car, plus la partie est belle, plus elle embellit le tout. Or la partie devient plus belle en devenant semblable au tout, en imitant son essence, en se conformant à son ordre. C’est ainsi qu’un rayon [de l’Intelligence suprême] descend ici-bas sur l’homme et y brille comme une étoile dans le ciel divin. Si l’on veut se former une image de l’univers; qu’on se représente une statue colossale et parfaitement belle, animée ou fabriquée par l’art de Vulcain, et dont les oreilles, le visage, la poitrine seraient parsemés d’étoiles étincelantes disposées avec une habileté merveilleuse (105).

Guthrie

THE CREATOR IS SO WISE THAT ALL COMPLAINTS AMOUNT TO GROTESQUENESS.

14. The order of the universe conforms to divine Intelligence without implying that on that account its author needed to go through the process of reasoning. Nevertheless, this order is so perfect that he who best knows how to reason would be astonished to see that even with reasoning one could not discover a plan wiser than that discovered as realized in particular natures, and that this plan better conforms to the laws   of Intelligence than any that could result from reasoning. It can never, therefore, be proper to find fault with the Reason that produces all things because of any (alleged imperfections) of any natural object, nor to claim, for the beings whose existence has begun, the perfection of the beings whose existence had no beginning, and which are eternal, both in the intelligible World, and in this sense-world. That would amount to wishing that every being should possess more good than it can carry, and to consider as insufficient the form it received. It would, for instance, amount to complaining, that man does not bear horns, and to fail to notice that, if Reason had to spread abroad everywhere, it was still necessary for something great to contain something less, that in everything there should be parts, and that these could not equal the whole without ceasing to be parts. In the intelligible World every thing is all; but here below each thing is not all things. The individual man does not have the same properties as the universal Man. For if the individual beings had something which was not individual, then they would be universal. We should not expect an individual being as such to possess the highest perfection; for then it would no longer be an individual being. Doubtless, the beauty of the part is not incompatible with that of the whole; for the more beautiful a part is, the more does it embellish the whole. Now the part becomes more beautiful on becoming similar to the whole, or imitating its essence, and in conforming to its order. Thus a ray (of the supreme Intelligence) descends here below upon man, and shines in him like a star in the divine sky. To imagine the universe, one should imagine a colossal statue that were perfectly beautiful, animated or formed by the art of Vulcan, whose ears, face and breast would be adorned with shimmering stars disposed with marvelous skill.

MacKenna

14. The ordinance of the Kosmos, then, is in keeping with the Intellectual Principle. True, no reasoning went to its creation, but it so stands that the keenest reasoning must wonder - since no reasoning could be able to make it otherwise - at the spectacle before it, a product which, even in the Kinds of the partial and particular Sphere, displays the Divine Intelligence to a degree in which no arranging by reason could express it. Every one of the ceaselessly recurrent types of being manifests a creating Reason-Principle above all censure. No fault is to be found unless on the assumption that everything ought to come into being with all the perfection of those that have never known such a coming, the Eternals. In that case, things of the Intellectual realm and things of the realm of sense must remain one unbroken identity for ever.

In this demand for more good than exists, there is implied a failure to recognize that the form allotted to each entity is sufficient in itself; it is like complaining because one kind of animal lacks horns. We ought to understand both that the Reason-Principle must extend to every possible existent and, at the same time, that every greater must include lesser things, that to every whole belong its parts, and that all cannot be equality unless all part is to be absent.

This is why in the Over-World each entity is all, while here, below, the single thing is not all [is not the Universe but a "Self"]. Thus too, a man, an individual, in so far as he is a part, is not Humanity complete: but wheresoever there is associated with the parts something that is no part [but a Divine, an Intellectual Being], this makes a whole of that in which it dwells. Man, man as partial thing, cannot be required to have attained to the very summit of goodness: if he had, he would have ceased to be of the partial order. Not that there is any grudging in the whole towards the part that grows in goodness and dignity; such an increase in value is a gain to the beauty of the whole; the lesser grows by being made over in the likeness of the greater, by being admitted, as it were, to something of that greatness, by sharing in that rank, and thus even from this place of man, from man’s own self, something gleams forth, as the stars shine in the divine firmament, so that all appears one great and lovely figure - living or wrought in the furnaces of craftsmanship - with stars radiant not only in the ears and on the brow but on the breasts too, and wherever else they may be displayed in beauty.