Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 47,10 (III, 2, 10) — O homem é responsável de seus (...)

ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 47,10 (III, 2, 10) — O homem é responsável de seus atos

Enéada III, 2, 10

sexta-feira 27 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Cap. 10: O homem é responsável de seus atos, não sendo submetido a uma necessidade extrínseca ou a influência dos astros

Míguez

10-Si los hombres son malos contra su voluntad y sin querer serlo, nadie puede acusarles de esta falta, ni siquiera el que la sufre, cual si su mal dependiese de ellos [1]. Que su maldad se origine necesariamente por el movimiento del cielo, o que sea una consecuencia de lo que antes ha ocurrido, eso dependerá de la misma naturaleza. Y si es la misma razón la que ha producido todo, ¿cómo no atribuirle la injusticia? Es verdad que los malos lo son contra su voluntad porque toda falta es involuntaria; pero esto no impide que sean seres que actúan por sí mismos y que, precisamente en estos actos, cometan las faltas de que hablamos. Si ellos mismos no actuasen, no cometerían en absoluto falta alguna. La necesidad de sus faltas no se encuentra fuera de ellos, sino en un sentido muy general. Y en cuanto al movimiento del cielo, ello no quiere decir que nada en absoluto dependa de nosotros; porque si todo viniese de fuera, todo ocurriría realmente como hubiesen querido los mismos que nos han hecho. De modo que, aun siendo los hombres unos impíos, no podrían resultar contrarios a la obra de los dioses; y si lo son, de ellos será la culpa. Digamos, en fin, que dado un principio se sigue una consecuencia, aunque para ello haya que tomar a la vez todos los antecedentes. Entre estos antecedentes también cuentan, naturalmente, los hombres. Y nos referimos a los hombres que se mueven hacia la virtud por su propia naturaleza, siendo como son enteramente dueños de sí.

Bouillet

X. Mais [dira-t-on], si les hommes ne sont méchants que malgré eux, et involontairement (79), on ne saurait dire que ceux qui commettent des injustices et ceux qui les souffrent soient responsables [les uns de leur férocité et les autres de leur lâcheté (80)] . Si la méchanceté des premiers [ainsi que la lâcheté des autres] est produite nécessairement par le cours des astres ou par l’action d’un principe dont elle n’est que l’effet, elle s’explique par des causes physiques. Mais si c’est la Raison même de l’univers qui produit de pareilles choses, comment ne commet-elle pas là une injustice ?

Les actes injustes sont involontaires en ce sens seulement qu’on n’a point la volonté de commettre une faute ; mais cette circonstance n’empêche pas que l’on n’agisse spontanément (81). Or, quand on agit spontanément, on est responsable de la faute ; on ne serait pas responsable de la faute, si l’on n’était pas auteur de l’acte. Si l’on dit que les méchants le sont nécessairement, cela ne signifie pas qu’ils subissent, une contrainte extérieure, mais que la méchanceté constitue leur caractère (82). Quant à l’influence du cours des astres, elle ne détruit pas notre liberté (83) : car; si tout acte était déterminé en nous par l’influence extérieure de tels agents, tout se passerait comme ces agents le désireraient ; par conséquent, les hommes ne feraient pas d’actes contraires à la volonté de ces agents. Il n’y aurait pas d’impies si les dieux seuls étaient les auteurs de tous nos actes ; donc l’impiété provient des hommes (84). Nous admettons que, la cause étant donnée, les effets s’en suivent pourvu que l’on embrasse toute la série des causes. Or l’homme est une cause ; il fait donc le bien par sa propre nature, et il constitue une cause libre.

Guthrie

IF UNJUST ACTS ARE PRODUCED ASTROLOGICALLY THEN DIVINE REASON IS TO BLAME.

10. But if men be evil only in spite of themselves, and involuntarily, it would be impossible to say that those who commit injustices, and those who suffer them are responsible (the former for their ferocity, and the latter for their cowardice. To this we answer that if the wickedness of the former (as well as the cowardice of the latter) be, necessarily, produced by the course of the stars, or by the action of a principle of which it is only the effect, then it is explained by physical reasons. But if it be the very Reason of the universe that produces such things, how does it not thereby commit an injustice?

EVEN INVOLUNTARINESS DOES NOT AFFECT SPONTANEITY THAT IS RESPONSIBLE.

Unjust actions are involuntary only in this sense that one does not have the will to commit a fault; but this circumstance does not hinder the spontaneity of the action. However, when one acts spontaneously, one is responsible for the fault; one would avoid responsibility for the fault only if one were not the author of the action. To say that the wicked are such necessarily, does not mean that they undergo an external constraint, but that their character is constituted by wickedness. The influence of the course of the stars does not destroy our liberty, for, if every action in us were determined by the exterior influence of such agents, everything would go on as these agents desired it; consequently, men would not commit any actions contrary to the will of these agents. If the divinities alone were the authors of all our actions, there would be no impious persons; therefore, impiety is due to men. It is true that, once the cause is given, the effects will follow, if only the whole series of causes be given. But man himself is one of these causes; he therefore does good by his own nature, and he is a free cause.

MacKenna

10. But: if the evil in men is involuntary, if their own will has not made them what they are, how can we either blame wrong-doers or even reproach their victims with suffering through their own fault?

If there is a Necessity, bringing about human wickedness either by force of the celestial movement or by a rigorous sequence set up by the First Cause, is not the evil a thin rooted in Nature? And if thus the Reason-Principle of the universe is the creator of evil, surely all is injustice?

No: Men are no doubt involuntary sinners in the sense that they do not actually desire to sin; but this does not alter the fact that wrongdoers, of their own choice, are, themselves, the agents; it is because they themselves act that the sin is in their own; if they were not agents they could not sin.

The Necessity [held to underlie human wickedness] is not an outer force [actually compelling the individual], but exists only in the sense of a universal relationship.

Nor is the force of the celestial Movement such as to leave us powerless: if the universe were something outside and apart from us it would stand as its makers willed so that, once the gods had done their part, no man, however impious, could introduce anything contrary to their intention. But, as things are, efficient act does come from men: given the starting Principle, the secondary line, no doubt, is inevitably completed; but each and every principle contributes towards the sequence. Now Men are Principles, or, at least, they are moved by their characteristic nature towards all that is good, and that nature is a Principle, a freely acting cause.


[1La teoría platónica expuesta en las Leyes, 731 c, es la de que nadie es malo voluntariamente. Plotino admite que los malos lo son contra su voluntad, pero sin que esto sea obstáculo para que actúen por sí mismos.