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Plotino - Tratado 33,11 (II, 9, 11) — Refutação do mito de Sofia e daquele sobre o nascimento do demiurgo

Enéada II, 9, 11

domingo 19 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulo 11: Refutação do mito de Sabedoria e daquele do nascimento do demiurgo.

  • 1-14. A alma não se declina.
  • 14-27. Eles se enganam sobre a natureza do demiurgo.
  • 27-29. É arbitrário dizer que o demiurgo produz primeiramente o fogo.

Míguez

11. Pero vayamos primero a esta cuestión: si la sabiduría no ha descendido y se limita a iluminar las tinieblas, ¿cómo se pretende decir justamente que ha inclinado hacia abajo? Porque si se quiere afirmar que una corriente luminosa ha salido de ella, no conviene emplear el término inclinar, a no ser que se admita una realidad situada abajo, a la que llegó la sabiduría con un movimiento de tipo local, iluminándola precisamente por su proximidad a ella.

Y si permanece en sí misma e ilumina sin tener que realizar ninguna acción, ¿por qué es ella sola la que ilumina y no lo hacen, en cambio, otros seres más poderosos que ella? Por otra parte, si ha podido iluminar únicamente con el pensamiento del mundo y como consecuencia de él, ¿por qué no produjo el mundo a la vez que lo iluminaba? ¿Por qué hubo de esperar a la generación de las imágenes? Y, además, ¿cómo este pensamiento del mundo, esta llamada por ellos "tierra extraña", producida, como dicen, por seres superiores, no forzó a inclinarse a los que la han producido? Habría que preguntarse también cómo es que la materia, una vez iluminada, produce destellos animados y no naturalezas corpóreas. La imagen de un alma no necesita para nada de las tinieblas ni de la materia, sino que, una vez producida, sigue de cerca a la causa que la produce y permanece unida a ella. Pero, además, ¿es esa imagen una sustancia o, como ellos dicen, un pensamiento? Porque si realmente es una sustancia, ¿qué diferencia manifiesta con el ser del cual proviene? Si se trata de otra especie de alma, y si la primera es un alma razonable, la imagen de que hablamos es un alma vegetativa o generadora. Y si es así, ¿cómo ha creado el demiurgo: para ser honrado, o por simple jactancia y atrevimiento? Con esto se le priva de su acción imaginativa y, aun más, de la facultad de razonar; pero, ¿por qué entonces habría de hacer el mundo de una materia y de una imagen? Si se trata de un pensamiento, convendrá indicar primero de dónde le viene ese nombre; luego, cómo es realmente, si no otorgamos el poder de producir a una simple noción mental. Pero, ¿de qué modo concebir la producción tratándose de una mera imagen? Hablar primero de un ser, luego de otro, que viene después de éste, resulta algo arbitrario. ¿Por qué ha de ser el fuego el primer ser?

Bouillet

[11] D’abord, si l’Âme n’est pas descendue, si elle s’est bornée à illuminer les ténèbres (112), comment aurait-on le droit de dire qu’elle a incliné ? En effet, si une espèce de lumière s’est écoulée de l’Âme (113), ce n’est pas une raison de dire que l’Âme a incliné, à moins d’admettre qu’il y avait une chose au-dessous d’elle [les ténèbres], qu’elle s’en est approchée par un mouvement local, et qu’arrivée près de cette chose, elle l’a illuminée. Au contraire, si elle l’a illuminée tout en restant en elle-même (ἐφ ἑαυτῆς μένουσα ἐνέλαμψε), sans rien faire pour cela (114), pourquoi a-t-elle seule illuminé cette chose [les ténèbres ] ? Pourquoi les êtres plus puissants que l’Âme [les Éons supérieurs à l’Âme] n’ont-ils pas aussi illuminé les ténèbres? Ce n’est [disent les Gnostiques] qu’après avoir conçu la Raison du monde (τῷ λογισμὸν λαβεῖν κόσμου) que l’Âme a pu illuminer les ténèbres, en vertu même de cette conception rationnelle. Mais alors, pourquoi n’a-t-elle pas fait le monde en même temps qu’elle a illuminé les ténèbres, mais a-t-elle attendu la génération des images [psychiques] ? Ensuite; comment cette Raison du monde, que les Gnostiques appellent la Terre étrangère (ἡ γῆ ἡ ξένη) (115) et qui a été produite par les puissances supérieures, comme-ils le disent, n’a-t-elle pas amené ses auteurs à incliner? Enfin; pourquoi la matière illuminée produit-elle des images psychiques (ἡ ὕλη φωτισθεῖσα εἴδωλα ψυχικὰ ποιεῖ), et non des corps? Il ne semble pas que l’image de l’Âme [la Sagesse] ait besoin de ténèbres ou de Matière. Si l’Âme crée, sa créature [la Sagesse] doit l’accompagner et lui rester attachée. D’ailleurs, qu’est -ce que cette créature? Est-ce une essence, ou, comme les Gnostiques le disent, une Conception (ἐννόημα) (116)? Si c’est une essence, quelle différence y a-t-il entre elle et son principe? Si c’est une autre espèce d’Âme, elle doit être une Âme végétative et génératrice, puisqu’elle a pour principe une Âme raisonnable (117). Si elle est une Âme végétative et génératrice, comment a-t-elle créé pour être honorée (118)? Comment a-t-elle créé par orgueil, par audace, en un mot, par imagination (119)? On a encore moins le droit de dire qu’elle a créé en vertu d’une conception rationnelle. En outre, quelle nécessité y avait-il que la mère du Démiurge le composât de matière et d’une image (ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἰδώλον) . Si l’on parle de Conception (ἐννόημα), qu’on explique d’abord d’où vient ce nom ; ensuite, qu’on montre comment une Conception peut constituer un être réel, à moins qu’on ne donne à cette Conception une force créatrice? Mais quelle force créatrice peut se trouver dans cet être imaginaire? Les Gnostiques disent que cette Image [le Démiurge] a d’abord été produite et que d’autres images ont été produites après elle (120) ; mais ils se permettent de le dire sans le prouver. Comment, par exemple, le feu a-t-il été produit d’abord [et les autres choses ensuite] (121)?

Guthrie

THE NUMBERLESS INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH A THEORY.

11. To begin with, if the Soul did not descend, if she limited herself to illuminating the darkness (which is synonymous with matter), by what right could it be asserted that the Soul inclined (downwards) ? If indeed a kind of light issued from the Soul, this does not justify an inclination of the Soul, unless we admit the existence of something (darkness) beneath her, that the Soul approached the darkness by a local movement, and that, on arriving near it, the Soul illuminated it. On the’contrary, if the Soul illuminated it while remaining self-contained, without doing anything to promote that illumination, why did the Soul alone illuminate the darkness? (According to the Gnostics) this occurred only after the Soul had conceived the Reason of the universe. Then only could the Soul illuminate the darkness, by virtue of this rational conception. But then, why did the Soul not create the world at the same time she illuminated the darkness, instead of waiting for the generation of ("psychic) images"? Further, why did this Reason of the world, which (the Gnostics) call the "foreign land," and which was produced by the superior powers, as they say, not move its authors to that inclination? Last, why does this illuminated matter produce psychic images, and not bodies? (Wisdom, or) the image of the Soul does not seem to stand in need of darkness or matter. If the Soul create, then her image (Wisdom) should accompany her, and remain attached to her. Besides, what is this creature of hers? Is it a being, or is it, as the (Gnostics) say, a conception? If it be a being, what difference is there between it and its principle? If it be some other kind of a soul, it must be a "soul of growth and generation," since its principle is a reasonable soul. If however (this Wisdom) be a "soul of growth and generation," how could it be said to have created for the purpose of being honored? In short, how could it have been created by pride, audacity, and imagination? Still less would we have the right to say that it had been created by virtue of a rational conception. Besides, what necessity was there for the mother of the demiurgic creator to have formed him of matter and of an image ? Speaking of conception, it would be necesssary to explain the origin of this term; then, unless a creative force be predicated of this conception, it would be necessary to show how a conception can Constitute a real being. - But what creative force can be inherent in this imaginary being? The (Gnostics) say that this image (the demiurgic creator) was produced first, and that only afterwards other images were created; but they permit themselves to assert that without any proof. For instance, how could it be said that fire was produced first (and other things only later)?

Taylor

XI. In the first place, therefore, if this soul did not descend, but illuminated the darkness, how can it be rightly said to have verged downward ? For it is not proper to say that it now verged, because something flowed from it such as light; unless one thing belonging to it was situated in the region beneath, but another proceeded locally to this region, and becoming near to it, illuminated it. But if this soul illuminated, abiding in itself, and not at all operating for this purpose, why did this soul alone illuminate, and not those natures also which are more powerful than it in the order of beings? If, however, they say that this soul, in consequence of forming a rational conception of the world, illuminated it from the discursive energy of reason, why did it not at one and the same time illuminate and make the world, but instead of this waited for the generation of images ? In the next place, this rational conception of the world, which is called by them a foreign land, and which was produced as they say by greater causes, did not occasion the makers of it to verge downward. Besides, how did it happen that matter being illuminated, made psychical images, but not the nature of bodies ? For the image of soul, would not be at all in want of darkness or matter ; but that which was generated would when generated follow its maker, and be suspended from him. Again, whether is this illumination from a reasoning process, essence, or as they say, a conception r For if it is essence, what is the difference between it, and that from which it proceeds ? But if it is another species of soul, and this rational, perhaps it is vegetable and generative. If, however, this be the case, how will it any longer be true that it made the world in order that it might be honoured for so doing; and how did it make it through arrogance and audacity, and in short, through imagination ? And still more absurd is it, that it should have made the world through a reasoning process. "Why, also, was it requisite, that the fabricator of the world should have made it from matter and an image r But if this illumination is a conception, in the first place it must be shown whence the name derives its origin ; and in the next place how it produces, unless it imparts to the conception a fabricative power. But how can there be production with a fiction r They will say, that this thing is first, and another is posterior to it. This, however, is asserted without any authority. Why, also, was fire the first thing produced [and afterwards other things] ?

MacKenna

11. Now, in the first place, if the Soul has not actually come down but has illuminated the darkness, how can it truly be said to have declined? The outflow from it of something in the nature of light does not justify the assertion of its decline; for that, it must make an actual movement towards the object lying in the lower realm and illuminate it by contact.

If, on the other hand, the Soul keeps to its own place and illuminates the lower without directing any act towards that end, why should it alone be the illuminant? Why should not the Kosmos draw light also from the yet greater powers contained in the total of existence?

Again, if the Soul possesses the plan of a Universe, and by virtue of this plan illuminates it, why do not that illumination and the creating of the world take place simultaneously? Why must the Soul wait till the representations of the plan be made actual?

Then again this Plan - the "Far Country" of their terminology - brought into being, as they hold, by the greater powers, could not have been the occasion of decline to the creators.

Further, how explain that under this illumination the Matter of the Kosmos produces images of the order of Soul instead of mere bodily-nature? An image of Soul could not demand darkness or Matter, but wherever formed it would exhibit the character of the producing element and remain in close union with it.

Next, is this image a real-being, or, as they say, an Intellection?

If it is a reality, in what way does it differ from its original? By being a distinct form of the Soul? But then, since the original is the reasoning Soul, this secondary form must be the vegetative and generative Soul; and then, what becomes of the theory that it is produced for glory’s sake, what becomes of the creation in arrogance and self-assertion? The theory puts an end also to creation by representation and, still more decidedly, to any thinking in the act; and what need is left for a creator creating by way of Matter and Image?

If it is an Intellection, then we ask first "What justifies the name?" and next, "How does anything come into being unless the Soul give this Intellection creative power and how, after all, can creative power reside in a created thing?" Are we to be told that it is a question of a first Image followed by a second?

But this is quite arbitrary.

And why is fire the first creation?