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ENÉADAS

Plotino - Tratado 12,7 (II, 4, 7) — Refutação das teorias pré-platônicas sobre a matéria

Enéada II, 4, 7

sexta-feira 3 de junho de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

Capítulos 6-16: A matéria sensível

  • Cap. 6. A matéria sensível existe.
  • Cap. 7. Refutação das teorias pré-platônicas sobre a matéria.
  • Cap. 8. A natureza da matéria sensível.
  • Cap. 9. A quantidade e a grandeza versus a matéria sensível.
  • Cap. 10. Como o Intelecto percebe a matéria.
  • Cap. 11, 1-13. Aporias relativas à noção de uma matéria sem grandeza.
  • Cap. 11, 13 - Cap. 12. Respostas às objeções precedentes.
  • Cap. 13. A matéria versus a qualidade
  • Cap. 14. A matéria e a privação.
  • Cap. 15. A matéria e o ilimitado.
  • Cap. 16. A matéria, a alteridade, a privação e o mal.

Míguez

7. Empédocles  , que considera los elementos en la materia, tiene en su contra la propia corrupción de éstos. Anaxágoras   hace de la materia la mezcla de todo; mezcla que no es sólo la más apta para producirlo todo, sino que ya lo contiene todo en acto. Al decir esto (Anaxágoras  ) destruye la inteligencia que él mismo introduce aquí; porque ya no es ella la que da la forma y la esencia, ni tampoco es algo que preceda a la materia, sino algo simultáneo. Pero esta simultaneidad resulta imposible; porque si la mezcla tiene participación en el ser, el ser es entonces anterior a ella; y sí, en cambio, la mezcla es un ser como este del que hablamos, es claro que necesitaremos un tercero por encima de ambos seres. Si se admite que el demiurgo es anterior, ¿qué necesidad hay de que las formas aparezcan en porciones pequeñas en la materia, o de que la inteligencia se procure el inútil trabajo de descomponerlas cuando puede realmente en una materia sin calificar, extender por todas partes la cualidad y la forma? ¿Cómo, en fin, no es imposible que todo se dé en todo? Otro supone que la materia es lo ilimitado. Pero, ¿qué quiere decir con esto? Si lo ilimitado es aquello que no puede recorrerse enteramente, no podrá darse como tal en los seres ni tampoco en sí mismo o en cualquier otra naturaleza a manera de accidente de un cuerpo. No podrá darse en sí, porque su parte seria necesariamente ilimitada; y, considerado como accidente, el sujeto al que accediese ya no sería entonces ni ilimitado, ni simple, ni en modo alguno, materia, como claramente se advierte.

En cuanto a los átomos no podrán alcanzar la consideración de la materia por la sencilla razón de que no existen en absoluto. Todo cuerpo, en efecto, puede ser dividido hasta el infinito; la serie continua de los cuerpos y el estado liquido exigen, a su vez, que la propia inteligencia; y el alma existan, las cuales no podrán componerse de átomos. Es indudable que con átomos no podrá fabricarse ninguna naturaleza diferente de los átomos, ni será posible que ningún artesano pueda trabajar con una materia discontinua. Muchas otras cosas podrían ser dichas contra esta hipótesis y hecho ya se han dicho; no convendrá, por tanto, perder más tiempo en esto.

Bouillet

VII. Empédocle   fait consister la matière dans les éléments (στοιχεῖα) (21): la corruption à laquelle ils sont exposés réfute cette opinion.

Anaxagore suppose que la matière (22) est un mélange (μίγμα), et, au lieu de dire que celle-ci est la capacité de devenir toutes choses, il affirme qu’elle contient toutes choses en acte (23); il anéantit ainsi l’Intelligence qu’il avait introduite dans le monde : car, selon lui, l’Intelligence ne donne pas au reste la forme et la figure : elle est contemporaine de la matière, au lieu de lui être antérieure (24). Or, il est impossible que l’Intelligence soit contemporaine de la matière : car si le mélange participe à l’être, l’être est antérieur ; si l’être lui-même est. le mélange, il leur faudra un troisième principe. Donc si le Démiurge est nécessairement antérieur, quel besoin y avait-il que les formes fussent en petit dans la matière, qu’ensuite l’Intelligence en démêlât l’inextricable confusion, quand il est; possible de donner des qualités à la matière (puisqu’elle n’en possède aucune) et de la soumettre tout entière à la forme? Enfin, comment tout peut-il être dans tout (25)?

Quant à celui qui admet que la matière est l’infini (τὸ ἄπειρον) (26), qu’il explique en quoi consiste cet infini. Par infini entend-il l’immensité? Rien de tel ne saurait exister dans la réalité : l’infini n’existe ni par soi, ni dans une autre nature, par exemple, comme accident d’un corps. L’infini n’existe pas par soi, parce que chacune de ses parties serait nécessairement infinie. L’infini n’existe pas non plus comme accident, parce que ce dont il serait l’accident ne serait par lui-même ni infini ni simple, et, par conséquent, ne serait pas la matière.

Les atomes [de Démocrite] (27) ne sauraient non plus remplir le rôle de matière parce qu’ils ne sont rien (28) : car tout corps est divisible à l’infini. On pourrait alléguer encore [contre le système des atomes] la continuité des corps et leur humidité. D’ailleurs il est impossible qu’il existe quelque chose sans l’intelligence et l’âme, qui ne sauraient être composées d’atomes ; il est impossible qu’une autre nature que les atomes produise quelque chose avec les atomes, parce que nul Démiurge ne saurait produire quelque chose avec une matière sans continuité. On pourrait faire et on a fait mille autres objections contre ce système. Mais il est superflu de prolonger cette discussion.

Guthrie

THE VIEWS OF EMPÉDOCLES AND ANAXÁGORAS ON MATTER.

7. (According to Aristotle  ), Empédocles   thinks matter consists of elements; but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they are exposed. (According to Aristotle  ), Anaxágoras   supposes that matter is a mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture) is capable of becoming all things, he insists that it contains all things in actualization. Thus he annihilates the intelligence that he had introduced into the world; for, according to him, it is not intelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form; it is contemporaneous with matter, instead of preceding it. Now it is impossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter, for if mixture participate in essence, then must essence precede it; if, however, essence itself be the mixture, they will need some third principle. Therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede, what need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter, for intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion, when it is possible to predicate qualities of matter, because matter had none of its own, and thus to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how could (the demiurgic creator) then be in all?

REFUTATION OF ANAXIMANDER  ’S VIEWS ABOUT MATTER.

(Anaximander  ) had better explain the consistence of the infinity by which he explains matter. Does he, by infinity, mean immensity? In reality this would be impossible. Infinity exists neither by itself, nor in any other nature, as, for instance, the accident of a body. The infinite does not exist by itself, because each of its parts would necessarily be infinite. Nor does the infinite exist as an accident, because that of which it would be an accident would, by itself, be neither infinite, nor simple; and consequently, would not be matter.

REFUTATION OF DEMOCRITUS  ’S ATOMS AS EXPLANATIONS OF MATTER.

(According to Aristotle  ’s account of Democritus  ), neither could the atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing (as before thought Cicero). Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against the system of the atoms) might further be alleged the continuity and humidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist without intelligence and soul, which could not be composed of atoms. Nothing with a nature different from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, because no demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked continuity. Many other objections against this system have and can be made; but further discussion is unnecessary.

Taylor

VII. Empedocles  , however, who substitutes the elements for matter, has the corruption of them testifying against him. But Anaxagoras, who makes the mixture of things to be matter, and who says, that it has not an aptitude to [become] all things, but has all things in energy, subverts the intellect which he introduces; not assigning to it the production of morphe and form, nor asserting that it is prior to matter, but that it subsists in conjunction with it. It is, however, impossible that intellect and matter should be con-subsistent. For if the mixture participates of being, it follows that being is prior to it. But if being also is a mixture, a certain third thing is wanting to these. If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus should have a prior subsistence, why is it necessary that forms should be in matter according to parvitude; and that afterwards intellect by a vainly laborious process should separate them from each other? For it is possible to impress quality in matter, since it is without quality, and to extend morphe through the whole of it. And, besides, is it not impossible that all tilings should be in every thing ? But he who asserts that the infinite is matter, should explain what this infinite is. And if it is infinite in such a way as that which cannot be passed over, it must be observed, that there is not any such things among beings, neither if it is the infinite itself, nor if it is inherent in another nature, as an accident to a certain body. It is not, indeed, the infinite itself, because the part of it is necessarily infinite. Nor is it the infinite as an accident, because that to which it is an accident would not be of itself infinite, nor simple, and therefore evidently would not be matter.

But neither have atoms the order of matter, which indeed have no subsistence whatever [i.e. as things perfectly indivisible]. For every body is entirely divisible. This opinion is also confuted from the continuity and moisture of bodies; and also from the impossibility of things subsisting without intellect and soul, which could not be formed from atoms. Again, it is not possible to fabricate any other nature, besides atoms from atoms; since no artificer is able to produce any thing from matter which is not continuous. Ten thousand other objections might and have been urged against this hypothesis, and therefore it is superfluous to dwell longer on these particulars.

MacKenna

7. Empedokles in identifying his "elements" with Matter is refuted by their decay.

Anaxagoras, in identifying his "primal-combination" with Matter - to which he allots no mere aptness to any and every nature or quality but the effective possession of all - withdraws in this way the very Intellectual-Principle he had introduced; for this Mind is not to him the bestower of shape, of Forming Idea; and it is co-aeval with Matter, not its prior. But this simultaneous existence is impossible: for if the combination derives Being by participation, Being is the prior; if both are Authentic Existents, then an additional Principle, a third, is imperative [a ground of unification]. And if this Creator, Mind, must pre-exist, why need Matter contain the Forming-Ideas parcel-wise for the Mind, with unending labour, to assort and allot? Surely the undetermined could be brought to quality and pattern in the one comprehensive act?

As for the notion that all is in all, this clearly is impossible.

Those who make the base to be "the infinite" must define the term.

If this "infinite" means "of endless extension" there is no infinite among beings; there is neither an infinity-in-itself [Infinity Abstract] nor an infinity as an attribute to some body; for in the first case every part of that infinity would be infinite and in the second an object in which the infinity was present as an attribute could not be infinite apart from that attribute, could not be simplex, could not therefore be Matter.

Atoms again cannot meet the need of a base.

There are no atoms; all body is divisible endlessly: besides neither the continuity nor the ductility of corporeal things is explicable apart from Mind, or apart from the Soul which cannot be made up of atoms; and, again, out of atoms creation could produce nothing but atoms: a creative power could produce nothing from a material devoid of continuity. Any number of reasons might be brought, and have been brought, against this hypothesis and it need detain us no longer.