Página inicial > Antiguidade > Neoplatonismo (245-529 dC) > Plotino (204-270 dC) – Tratados Enéadas > Plotino - Tratado 2,12 (IV, 7, 12) — A alma é imortal, indestrutível, (...)

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Plotino - Tratado 2,12 (IV, 7, 12) — A alma é imortal, indestrutível, indivisível e imutável (2)

Enéada IV, 7, 12

sábado 14 de maio de 2022, por Cardoso de Castro

    

Capítulo 9 a 12: A natureza da alma  .

  • Cap. 9. A alma é princípio de vida: ela tem o ser   e a vida por ela mesma.
  • Cap. 10. A alma é de natureza divina: ela goza eternamente de uma vida boa e refletida.
  • Cap. 11-12. A alma é imortal, indestrutível, indivisível   e imutável  .

12. Por outro lado, se sustentam que toda alma pode perecer, todas as coisas, deveriam ter perecido faz muito tempo. Mas se sustentam que esta alma pode perecer que esta outra não o pode, por exemplo se se sustenta que a alma do universo   é imortal, enquanto a nossa não o é, lhes é preciso explicar porque. Cada uma com efeito é princípio de movimento  , uma e outra têm a vida de si mesmas, uma e outra alcançam as mesmas coisas pelo mesmo meio, quando elas contemplam os seres que estão no céu e aqueles que estão além do céu, quando ela busca tudo o que é realmente e que ela ascende até o primeiro princípio. [...]
    

Igal

12 Además, si dijeren que toda alma   es corruptible, entonces hace tiempo debieran haber perecido todas las cosas. Mas si dijeren que un alma es corruptible y otra no, a saber que la del universo   es inmortal pero que la nuestra no, debieran decir por qué, pues cada una de las dos es «principio de movimiento» y cada una de las dos vive por sí misma y entra en contacto con los mismos objetos por el mismo medio cuando piensa tanto los seres celestes como los supracelestes, cuando investiga todo cuanto es por esencia lo que es y cuando se eleva hasta el primer Principio. Además, la intuición de cada cosa en sí que le viene de ella misma, de los objetos de contemplación que hay en ella, y se origina por la reminiscencia, le da una existencia anterior   al cuerpo y hace que sea eterna ella misma, puesto que se vale de ciencias eternas. Además, todo lo que se disuelve por haber tomado un ser compuesto para venir a la existencia   es naturalmente disoluble por la misma vía por la que se hizo compuesto. Ahora bien, el alma es una naturaleza unitaria y simple que vive en acto. Luego no se corromperá por esta vía.

—Pero si de divide, perecerá por fragmentación.

—No; como ya se demostró, el alma no es una masa ni está dotada de cuantidad.

—Pero si se modifica, se corromperá.

—No; la modificación, cuando corrompe, remueve la forma pero deja la materia. Ahora bien, ésta es una afección propia de un compuesto. Si, pues, el alma no es corruptible por ninguno de estos conceptos, forzosamente será incorruptible.

Bouillet

[XII] Soutiendra-t-on que toute âme est périssable (87)? Dans ce cas, tout devrait être détruit depuis longtemps. Dira-t-on que notre âme est mortelle, tandis que l’Âme universelle est immortelle ? Qu’on rende alors raison de cette différence. Chacune des deux est un principe de mouvement, vit par elle-même, saisit les mêmes objets par la même faculté, soit qu’elle pense les choses contenues dans le ciel ou supérieures au ciel, soit qu’elle considère l’essence de chaque être et qu’elle remonte jusqu’au premier principe. Puisque notre âme pense les essences absolues soit par les notions qu’elle en trouve en elle-même, soit par la réminiscence, évidemment elle est antérieure au corps; possédant des connaissances éternelles, elle doit être elle-même éternelle. Tout ce qui se dissout, n’existant que par sa composition, peut naturellement se dissoudre de la même manière qu’il est composé. Mais l’âme est un acte un, simple, dont l’essence est la vie ; elle ne peut donc périr de cette manière. Périra-t-elle en se divisant en une foule de parties ? Mais, comme nous l’avons démontré, l’âme n’est ni une masse, ni une quantité. Périra-t-elle en s’altérant? L’altération, en détruisant une chose, lui enlève sa forme et lui laisse sa mati  ère; c’est donc le propre d’un composé. Par conséquent, puisque l’âme ne peut périr d’aucune de ces façons, elle est impérissable.

Guthrie

THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE WAY IN WHICH SOUL COULD PERISH.

12. (17). (The Stoics), indeed, claim that every soul is perishable. In this case, everything should long since have been destroyed. Others might say that our soul were mortal  , while the universal   Soul were immortal. On them, however, is the burden of proof of a difference between the individual and universal souls. Both of them, indeed, are a principle of movement; both live by themselves; both grasp the same object by the same faculty, either by thinking the things contained in heaven, or by considering the nature («being») of each being, ascending unto the first principle. Since our soul thinks absolute essences either by the notions she finds within herself, or by reminiscence, she evidently is prior to the body. Possessing knowledge of eternal entities, she herself must be eternal. All that dissolves, existing only by its compositeness, can naturally dissolve in the same manner that it became composite. But the soul is a single, simple actualization, whose essence is life; not in this manner therefore can the soul perish. Neither could the soul perish by division into a number of parts; for, as we have shown, the soul is neither a mass nor a quantity. As little could the soul perish by alteration; for when alteration destroys anything, it may remove its form, but leaves its matter; alteration, therefore, is a characteristic of something composite. Consequently as the soul cannot perish in any of these ways, she is imperishable.

Taylor

XII. Farther still, if they say that every soul is corruptible, it would be requisite that all things should have long since perished. But if they assert that one soul is corruptible, and another not, as for instance, that the soul of the universe is immortal, but ours not, it is necessary that they should assign the cause of this difference. For each is the cause of motion, and each lives from itself. Each, likewise, comes into contact with the same things by the same power, intellectually perceiving the natures in the heavens, and also those that are beyond the heavens, investigating everything which has an essential subsistence, and ascending as far as to the first principle of things. To which may be added, that it is evident the soul gave being to itself prior to the body, from its ability of apprehending what each thing is, by itself, from its own inherent spectacles, and from reminiscence. And from its employing eternal sciences, it is manifest that it is itself perpetual. Besides, since everything which can be dissolved receives composition, hence, so far as a thing is a composite, it is naturally adapted to be dissolved. But soul being one simple energy, and a nature characterized by life, cannot be corrupted as a composite. Will it, therefore, through being divided and distributed into minute parts, perish ? Soul, however, is not, as we have demonstrated, a certain bulk or quantity. May it not, therefore, through being changed in quality, be corrupted ? Change in quality however which corrupts takes away form, but leaves the subject matter. But this is the passion of a composite. Hence, if it is not possible for the soul to be corrupted according to any of these modes, it is necessarily incorruptible.

MacKenna

12. (17) A further consideration is that if every soul is to be held dissoluble the universe must long since have ceased to be: if it is pretended that one kind of soul, our own for example, is mortal, and another, that of the All, let us suppose, is immortal, we demand to know the reason of the difference alleged.

Each is a principle of motion, each is self-living, each touches the same sphere by the same tentacles, each has intellection of the celestial order and of the super-celestial, each is seeking to win to what has essential being, each is moving upwards to the primal source.

Again: the soul’s understanding of the Absolute Forms by means of the visions stored up in it is effected within itself; such perception is reminiscence; the soul then must have its being before embodiment, and drawing on an eternal science, must itself be eternal.

Every dissoluble entity, that has come to be by way of groupment, must in the nature of things be broken apart by that very mode which brought it together: but the soul is one and simplex  , living not in the sense   of potential reception of life but by its own energy; and this can be no cause of dissolution.

But, we will be told, it tends to destruction by having been divided (in the body) and so becoming fragmentary.

No: the soul, as we have shown, is not a mass, not a quantity.

May not it change and so come to destruction?

No: the change that destroys annuls the form but leaves the underlying substance: and that could not happen   to anything except a compound.

If it can be destroyed in no such ways, it is necessarily indestructible.