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Plotino - Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) - imortalidade: polêmica contra o materialismo

Enéada IV, 7, 3

sexta-feira 31 de dezembro de 2021, por Cardoso de Castro

      

Capítulo 3: Refutação da definição epicuriana da alma  . 3.1-6. A alma não é corporal e ela é desprovida de partes.

      

tradução

3. E se alguém dissesse que assim não se passa, mas que são átomos ou coisas indivisíveis [atomon  ] que produzem [poiein  ] a alma   [psyche], quando elas se reúnem e em se unificando e em partilhando suas afecções [pathos  ], também seria refutado pelo fato que se trata de uma justaposição, mas que não forma um todo [holon  ], porque nada disto que é um e partilha suas afecções [sympatheia  ] não pode nascer de corpos [soma] que são desprovidos de afecção [apatheia] e que não podem formar uma unidade  , enquanto a alma partilha suas afecções com ela mesma. De coisas desprovidas de partes, nem corpo nem mesmo grandeza   não poderiam nascer [genesis  ].

E no entretanto, se dizem [Estoicismo  ], posto que este corpo é simples [haplous  ], que não é isto que é material [hyle  ] nele que possui de si mesmo   a vida [zoe  ] — posto que a matéria é desprovida de qualidade   —, mas que é isto que nele tem o nível de forma [eidos  ] que lhe confere a vida; se dizem que a realidade   [ousia  ] é esta forma, não isto que é composto de dois   elementos  , mas um dentre eles, então esta realidade será a alma. E esta realidade não poderia verdadeiramente ser um corpo, posto que ela não pode ser originária da matéria, pois se tal fosse o caso seria preciso de novo dividi-la da mesma maneira. Mas se dizem que é uma afecção da matéria e não uma realidade, então devem dizer de onde esta afecção e a vida vieram à matéria, pois assim é fato que matéria não se configura por ela mesma. É preciso portanto que haja algo que dispensa a vida, quer seja à matéria que ele a dispensa ou a um corpo qualquer, e esta coisa deve existir fora e além de toda natureza corporal. Pois nem mesmo haveria corpo se não existisse um poder psíquico. O corpo discorre e sua natureza reside no movimento   [panta rei]; e ele pereceria imediatamente se todas as coisas fossem corpos, até mesmo quando se desse a um deles o nome de alma [v. kinesis]. Pois este corpo seria afetado da mesma maneira que os outros corpos se eles tivessem a mesma matéria. Ou melhor, ele nem mesmo nasceria, mas todas as coisas nele permaneceriam ao nível da matéria: e o universo que é o nosso seria destruído se se o confiasse a um corpo a ligação de suas partes, dando o nível e até o nome de alma ao ar e ao sopro, que é o corpo mais divisível   que seja e que não tem por ele mesmo qualquer unidade. E posto que todos os corpos se fracionam, como alguém poderia confiar o universo que é o nosso a um dentre eles sem dele fazer uma coisa desprovida de intelecto   e movida pela aventura [Timeu   53a-b]? Pois qual ordem poderia haver em um sopro que tem necessidade   da ordem originária da alma? E qual razão ou qual intelecto? Ao contrário, se a alma existe, todos estes corpos se tornam seus auxiliares na ordenança do mundo como de cada vivente, uma potência contribuindo com outra para a completude do conjunto  . Mas se a alma não estivesse presente   no conjunto dos corpos, estes corpos não seriam nada, e eles não estariam certamente em ordem.

Míguez

3. Si no se admite esto y se afirma en cambio que la reunión de átomos o indivisibles es la que crea al alma, habrá que invocar como contrapartida la unión y la simpatía de las partes del alma, ya que no se produce ninguna intromisión y simpatía entre cuerpos que son impasibles e incapaces de reunirse en uno solo. Pero el alma posee simpatía consigo misma, y en cuanto al cuerpo y a la magnitud no podrían provenir de seres indivisibles.

Ciertamente, si el cuerpo es simple y de él se dice que su materia no posee la vida por sí misma — porque la materia es algo sin cualidad — , sino que ésta ha de atribuirse a la forma, entonces deberá afirmarse también que la forma es una sustancia, con lo cual el alma no será ya un compuesto de materia y de forma, sino más bien uno solo de estos términos, pero que, en definitiva, no constituye un cuerpo, porque si en él entrase la materia, tendríamos que analizarlo de nuevo del mismo modo. Cabría afirmar   que la forma es un estado   de la materia y no una sustancia, pero en este caso debería decirse igualmente de dónde han venido este estado y esta vida a la materia. Porque la materia es incapaz de darse una forma y de introducir un alma en sí misma. Conviene que haya alguien que produzca la vida, y si esta función no puede atribuirse a la materia ni a un cuerpo cualquiera, el ser al que corresponda se encontrará fuera y aun más allá de toda naturaleza corpórea. Porque no podría existir el cuerpo, de no existir también la potencia del alma. La naturaleza del cuerpo es fluyente y se encuentra siempre en movimiento; de tal modo que el cuerpo mismo perecería al instante si todas las cosas fuesen cuerpos, y aun en el caso de que a alguno de éstos se le diese el nombre de alma. Porque es claro que este cuerpo sufriría la misma suerte que los demás, al tener como ellos una sola y única materia. O mejor aún, ya ni siquiera nacería sino que se vería detenido en el estado de la materia, por no contar con nada que pudiera informarle. Tal vez tampoco habría materia y nuestro universo resultaría por completo   destruido al confiarse a un cuerpo la misión unificadora, esto es, al dar la categoría de alma, e incluso su nombre, a un cuerpo como el aire o el soplo, seres de los más disipables y que no encierran en sí mismos unidad alguna. Si, pues, todos los cuerpos se dividen, ¿cómo confiar el universo a uno cualquiera de ellos? ¿No haríamos de él un ser privado de inteligencia, que se mueve tan sólo al azar  ? Porque, ¿qué ordenación podrá existir en un soplo que da al alma su regla? ¿Y qué razón? ¿Y qué inteligencia? Pero, si el alma existe, todo esto se halla a su servicio para la ordenación del mundo y de cada uno de los seres, contribuyendo a la vez cada fuerza a la regulación del conjunto. Sin el alma nada podría existir y no sería sólo el orden el que faltase.

Guthrie

NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY.

3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one and sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought Leucippus, Democritus   and Epicurus  .) To refute this error, we have to examine the nature of sympathy (or community of affection, a Stoic characteristic of a living being — Eneada-II, 3, 5) and juxtaposition (Eneada-II, 7, 1). On the one hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of being united, and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic whole such as is the soul, which is sympathetic with herself. On the other hand, how could a body or extension be constituted by (a juxtaposition of) atoms?

SOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY BODY IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM.

(c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form, while the soul is a simple substance.) Inasmuch as matter possesses no quality (Eneada-II, 4, 7), the matter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself. That which imparts life to it must then be its form. If form is a "being," the soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form; it will be only matter or form. Consequently, the soul will not be the body, since the body is not constituted by matter exclusively, as could be proved analytically, if necessary.

IF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER, WHENCE THAT AFFECTION?

(d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of matter, because matter could not give itself a form.) Some Stoics might deny that form was a "being," asserting the soul to be a mere affection (or, manner of being) of matter. From whence then did matter acquire this affection and animating life? Surely matter itself could not endow itself with a form and a soul. That which endows matter or any body with life must then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal nature.

NO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER OF THE UNIVERSAL   SOUL.

(e.) (No body could subsist without the power of the universal soul.) Besides no body could subsist without the power of the universal Soul (from Numenius), Every body, indeed, is in a perpetual flow and movement (as thought Heraclitus  , in Plato  , Cratylus  ), and the world would soon perish if it contained nothing but bodies, even if some one of them were to be called soul; for such a soul, being composed of the same matter as the other bodies, would undergo the same fate that they do; or rather, there would not even be any body, everything would remain in the condition of shapeless matter, since there would exist no principle to fashion it. Why, there would not even be any matter, and the universe would be annihilated to nothingness, if the care of keeping its parts united were entrusted to some body which would have nothing but the name of soul, as for instance, to air, or a breath without cohesion, which could not be one, by itself. As all bodies are divisible, if the universe depended on a body, it would be deprived of intelligence and given up to chance. How, indeed, could there be any order in a spirit   which itself would need to receive order from a soul? How could this spirit contain reason and intelligence ? On the hypothesis   of the existence of the soul, all these elements serve to constitute the body of the world, and of every animal, because all different bodies together work for the end of all; but without the soul, there is no order, and even nothing exists any more.

MacKenna

3. Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very unity of soul and by the prevailing sympathy as much as by the very coherence of the constituents. Bodily materials, in nature repugnant to unification and to sensation  , could never produce unity or self-sensitiveness, and soul is self-sensitive. And, again, constituents void of part could never produce body or bulk.

Perhaps we will be asked to consider body as a simple entity [disregarding the question of any constituent elements]: they will tell us, then, that no doubt, as purely material, it cannot have a self-springing life - since matter is without quality - but that life is introduced by the fact that the Matter is brought to order under Forming-Idea. But if by this Forming-Idea they mean an essential, a real being, then it is not the conjoint of body and idea that constitutes soul: it must be one of the two items and that one, being [by hypothesis] outside of the Matter, cannot be body: to make it body would simply force us to repeat our former analysis  .

If on the contrary they do not mean by this Forming-Idea a real being, but some condition or modification of the Matter, they must tell us how and whence this modification, with resultant life, can have found the way into the Matter: for very certainly Matter does not mould itself to pattern or bring itself to life.

It becomes clear that since neither Matter nor body in any mode has this power, life must be brought upon the stage by some directing principle external and transcendent to all that is corporeal.

In fact, body itself could not exist in any form if soul-power did not: body passes; dissolution is in its very nature; all would disappear in a twinkling if all were body. It is no help to erect some one mode of body into soul; made of the same Matter as the rest, this soul body would fall under the same fate: of course it could never really exist: the universe of things would halt at the material, failing something to bring Matter to shape.

Nay more: Matter itself could not exist: the totality of things in this sphere is dissolved if it be made to depend upon the coherence of a body which, though elevated to the nominal rank of "soul," remains air, fleeting breath [the Stoic pneuma, rarefied matter, "spirit" in the lower sense  ], whose very unity is not drawn from itself.

All bodies are in ceaseless process of dissolution; how can the kosmos   be made over to any one of them without being turned into a senseless haphazard drift? This pneuma - orderless except under soul - how can it contain order, reason, intelligence? But: given soul, all these material things become its collaborators towards the coherence of the kosmos and of every living being, all the qualities of all the separate objects converging to the purposes of the universe: failing soul in the things of the universe, they could not even exist, much less play their ordered parts.

Taylor

III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by similitude of passion, and by apposition; since one thing will not thus be generated through the whole, nor will that which is co-passive be produced from bodies which are without passion and incapable of being united. But soul is co-passive with itself. And of impartibles neither body nor magnitude can consist. Moreover, with respect to a simple body, they will not say that it has life from itself so far as it is material. For matter is void of quality. But they will rather say that what is arranged in body according to form possesses life. Hence, if they say that this form is essence, soul will not be both, but one of these; and this will no longer be body. For this will not also consist of matter; since if it did, we must again analyze it after the same manner. But if they assert that this form is a passion of matter and not essence, they must inform us what that is from which this passion and life are derived into matter. For matter will not give form to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is necessary that there should be something which is the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychical power. For body [perpetually] flows, and its nature is in [continual] motion. The universe also would rapidly perish if all things were bodies; though some one of them should be denominated soul. For it would suffer the same things as other bodies, since there would be one matter in all of them. Or rather, nothing would be generated, but all things would stop in matter, as there would not be any thing to invest it with form. Perhaps, too, neither would matter have any subsistence whatever. This universe also will be dissolved, if it is committed to the connexion of body, and the order of soul is given to body, as far as to names, viz. to air and a dissipable spirit, and which has not from itself any oneness. For how is it possible, since all bodies are divisible, that this universe if it is committed to any one of them, should not be borne along in a foolish and casual manner ? For what order is there, or reason or intellect, in a pneumatic substance, which is in want of order from soul? But if soul, indeed, has a subsistence, all these will be subservient to it in order to the composition of the world, and the existence of every animal, a different power contributing from a different thing to [the perfection of] the whole. If soul, however, is not present to the whole of things, these will neither have a subsistence, nor any arrangement.


Ver online : ENÉADAS III-IV (Gredos)