Plotino (Enéada V, 1, 10) – Do Uno

10. It has been shown that we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the One beyond being, of such a kind as our argument wanted to show, so far as demonstration was possible in these matters, and next in order there is Being and Intellect, and the nature of Soul in the third place. And just as in nature there are these three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are present also in ourselves. I do not mean in [ourselves as] beings of the sense  -world—for these three are separate [from the things of sense]—but in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception; “ outside ” here is used in the same sense as those realities are also said to be “ outside ” the whole universe: so the corresponding realities in man are said to be “ outside ”, as Plato speaks of the “ inner man ”. [1] Our soul then also is a divine thing and of a nature different [from the things of sense], like the universal   nature of soul; and the human soul is perfect when it has intellect; and intellect is of two kinds, the one which reasons and the one which makes it possible to reason. Now this reasoning part of the soul  , which needs no bodily instrument for its reasoning, but preserves its activity in purity in order that it may be able to engage in pure reasoning, one could without mistake place, as separate and unmixed   with body, in the primary intelligible realm. For we should not look for a place in which to put it, but make it exist outside all place. For this is how it is by itself and outside and immaterial, when it is alone and retains nothing from the nature of body. This is the reason why Plato says of the universe also that the craftsman wrapped the soul round it “ from outside ”, indicating the part of the soul which remains in the intelligible; and he said obscurely about us that the soul is “ on top in the head ”. And his exhortation to separate ourselves is not meant in a spatial sense—this [higher part] of soul is naturally separated—but refers to our not inclining to the body, and to our not having mental   images, and our alienation from the body [2]—if by any chance one could make the remaining form of soul ascend, and take along with us to the heights that of it which is established here below, which alone is the craftsman and modeller of the body and is actively concerned with it.

§5.1.10. It has already been shown that it is necessary to believe that things are this way: that there is the One which transcends Being, which is such as the argument strove to show to the extent that it is possible to demonstrate anything about these matters; that next in line is Being and Intellect; and that third is the nature that is Soul.

And just as in nature these aforementioned three are found, so it is necessary to believe as well   that these are in us. I do not mean that they are among sensibles – for these three are separate from sensibles – but that they are in things that are outside the sensible order, using the term ‘outside ’ in the same manner in which it is used to refer to those things that are outside the whole of heaven. In saying that they belong to a human being, I mean exactly what Plato means by ‘the inner human being’.

So, our soul is something divine and of another nature [i.e., other than sensibles], like the nature of all soul; it is perfect by having intellect. One part of intellect is that which engages in calculative reasoning and one part is that which makes calculative reasoning possible. The calculative reasoning part of soul is actually in need of no corporeal organ for its calculative reasoning, having its own activity in purity in order that it also be possible for it to reason purely. Someone who supposed it to be separate and not mixed with body and in the primary intelligible world would not be mistaken. For we should not search for a place in which to situate it; rather, we should make it outside all place. For this is how it is for that which is by itself, outside and immaterial, whenever it is alone, retaining nothing from the nature of the body. Because of this, Plato says that the Demiurge ‘in addition’ encircled the soul of the universe from ‘outside’, pointing to the part of the soul that abides in the intelligible world. In our case, he hid his meaning when he said that it is ‘at the top of our head’.

And his exhortation ‘to be separate’ is not meant spatially – for our intellect is separate by nature – but is an exhortation not to incline to the body even by acts of imagination, and to alienate ourselves from the body, if somehow one could lead the remaining part of the soul upwards, or even carry upward that which is situated in the sensible world, that part that alone acts demiurgically on the body and has the job of shaping it and caring for it.

10. On a déjà montré qu’il faut penser qu’il en va bien ainsi : d’abord, il y a ce qui est situé au-delà de l’être, l’Un, tel que notre exposé entendait le montrer pour autant que la démonstration est possible en pareil cas ; tout juste après, viennent l’être et l’Intellect ; et en troisième lieu vient l’Âme. Tout comme ces trois réalités dont on a parlé sont dans la nature, de même il faut penser qu’elles sont aussi en nous. Je ne dis pas en nous-mêmes en tant que nous sommes dans le sensible, car ces réalités sont séparées du sensible, mais en nous-mêmes dans la mesure où nous sommes à l’extérieur des choses sensibles (« à l’extérieur » s’entend au sens où l’on dit encore que ces réalités sont à l’extérieur du ciel en son entier) [3] ; ainsi en va-t-il en l’homme de ce que Platon   appelle : « l’homme intérieur » [4]. Il s’ensuit aussi que notre âme est chose divine et qu’elle est d’une autre nature que les choses sensibles, tout comme l’âme en sa totalité. Or, l’Âme est parfaite lorsqu’elle possède l’Intellect ; mais l’Intellect est de deux sortes : celui qui raisonne et celui qui permet de raisonner [5]. Eh bien, cette faculté de l’âme qui raisonne n’a besoin d’aucun organe corporel pour raisonner, car elle garde son activité pure afin de pouvoir raisonner de manière pure, et on ne se tromperait pas en la posant dans le monde intelligible qui tient la première place, comme séparée du corps et non mélangée à lui [6]. En effet, il ne faut pas chercher un lieu où l’installer, mais il faut la poser en dehors de tout lieu. Oui, voici en quoi consiste le fait d’« être en soi », d’être « extérieur » et d’être « immatériel » quand on est seul et qu’on ne doit rien au corps [7]. Et voilà pourquoi il dit également que le démiurge prit l’âme qui se trouvait « encore à l’extérieur » de l’univers pour l’en envelopper [8] ; voulant désigner par là la partie de l’âme qui reste dans l’intelligible. En ce qui nous concerne, en revanche, il s’est exprimé d’une manière obscure, en disant que notre âme est « au sommet dans la tête » [9]. De surcroît, l’exhortation à nous séparer [10] ne doit pas être entendue en un sens local, car cette partie de l’âme est déjà séparée par nature ; elle incite plutôt à ne pas s’incliner vers le corps, même en imagination, et à lui rester étranger, si d’une façon ou d’une autre on arrive à faire remonter l’autre espèce d’âme et à amener aussi avec nous vers le haut la partie de l’âme qui est établie ici-bas, et qui est la seule à fabriquer et à façonner le corps [11] en y consacrant son activité.